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ABSTRACT 
This thesis develops a model of the policy making process 
and applies it to the issue of regulatory agency capture. The model 
allows the possibility of substantial influence of unorganized, non-
producer groups. It shows that under certain circumstances an agency 
will provide benefits for these groups as long as they continue 
to participate e1ectora11y on the issue (i.e., as long as the regu1a-
. tory issue remains a component of voters' decisions between candidates). 
The model is called the political cycles model because of the following 
two conclusions. Based on a comparative static result, it shows .that 
if the mass group no longer generates electoral rewards, producers 
will dominate agency policy making. The second conclusion is that 
the process may work in reverse; a captured agency may be revitalized 
when a mass group begins to generate rewards on this issue. 
Following the theoretical presentation, Part III tests the 
political cycles model against alternative conceptions of agency 
capture, (the carte1-by-design and the life cycle hypothesis). The 
models make diffe r ent predictions about Congressional appropriations 
behavior under specified circumstances. Budgetary patterns for 
several agencies are observed to determine which model most adequately 
explains the observations. The results, though tentative, r eveal the 
influence of nonproducer groups in a manner which rules out both the 
life cycle and the cartel-by-design models while supporting the model 
presented here. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MARKET INTERVENTION AND COLLECTIVE CHOICE 
The American political system frequently alters the market 
economy's allocation of resources. Since 1887, market intervention 
has occasionally taken the form of an independent regulatory commission 
designed to oversee decisions made by a specified set of economic 
actors. A major challenge to the positive theory of collective choice 
is to explain the observed pattern of intervention. 
Nearly all of the independent commissions are associated 
with a type of market failure, including t he Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Federal 
Trade Commis'sion (FTC), the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), and the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC). Congress established the ICC to regulate railroads 
at a time of local railway monopolies. The caA D~ jurisdiction, food 
quality and drug safety, includes potential informational inefficiencies. 
The FTC administers the Clay ton Act addressing monopolization. The 
FPC's original concern was electric power monopolies. The FCC regulates 
the airwaves, a form of public good. And finally, the CPSC oversees 
consumer product safety, also subject to informational inefficiencies. 
These agencies were created at a time of public concern over the issue, 
concern which included support for market intervention. This suggests 
the interpretation of the independent commissions embodied in the public 
2 
interest theory. It asserts that the commissions are the political 
system's response to public demands to rectify market failure problems 
and therefore are designed to benefit consumers by increasing economic 
efficiency. 
The evidence amassed in the postwar literature on regulation 
questions the notion that regulatory agencies resulted from popular 
reform movements. These agencies have been shown to benefit the 
groups they regulate rather than to correct a market failure despite 
their mandates to regulate in the public interest. Economists studying 
the effects of agency policy conclude that there exists little relation-
ship between agency policy and attempts to redress market failure. 
Political scientists, studying the relationship between political 
groups who participated in an agency's creation and the subsequent 
distribution of benefits, arrive at similar conclusions: regula tory 
.agencies tend to benefit the groups they regulate. 
These studies raise the issue of regulatory agency capture . 
Loosely, capture occurs when the groups nominally being regulated either 
explicitly dominate agency policy making, or are its main beneficiaries. 
The process by which an agency becomes captured is a central concern of 
both the political science and economics literatures. Various hypotheses 
have been posed to explain the observed pattern of agency decisions. The 
cartel-by-design and the life cycle hypotheses are the two main explana-
tions in the literature. Briefly, the first asserts that the agencies 
are des.igned to benefit the regulated actors . The second views agencies 
as beneficial to mass-based groups (such as consumers) in its initial . 
stages, followed by a decay process in which agency policy swings from 
3 
active regulation against the industry to action on behalf of the 
industry. 
Neither of these views allow sufficient variation in agency 
policy to explain the observed pattern of regulation. Some agencies are 
observed to benefit nonproducer groups immediately following their 
formation. This causes problems with the cartel-by-design thesis which 
predicts that producers are the main beneficiaries~ Other agencies 
are revitalized to benefit nonproducers after years of promulgating 
regulations beneficial solely to producers. The life cycle view predicts 
that only producers will benefit in the agency's final stage. It does 
not allow the process to be reversed. 
These observations call for a more general conception of the 
policy making process which allows greater variation in the possible 
patterns of agency policy making. The main goal of this thesis is 
to provide a model which serves this purpose. Part I defines general 
issues of regulatory agency policy making. Part II presents the 
theoretical model of the policy making process and applies it to 
regulatory agency capture. Part III then explores five regulatory arenas 
to see which view of the policy making process most adequately describes 
agency behavior. 
The development of an alternative conception of the agency 
procedes as follows. The next two chapters make up Part I, "The Problem." 
Chapter 2 reviews the main explanations of regulatory agency capture and 
then reviews the literature in greater detail. The inadequacies of the 
different approaches are enumerated, especially failures in explaining 
certain events. Chapter -3, "The Economics of Safety," follows with 
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an introduction to the economic models of product safety. 
Part II, "Regulatory Agency Capture," presents the theoretical 
model of the policy making process. The model itself is developed in 
chapter 4, "A Model of the Representative Legislature." This approach 
to the political system encompasses a representative legislature and 
allows response to all groups which participate on the regulatory issue. 
The main results are based on the reciprocity theorem. Under certain 
conditions, .the models show that an agency may be created to regulate 
an industry to benefit a group of nonproducers. A comparative static 
result derived fJ;om the main theorem shows that if the nonproducer 
support gradually fades from the political environment, then agency 
policy making will change to benefit the industry. The latter group 
remains the sole source of rewards for political actors following the 
decline of nonproducers. The political system then responds to the new 
distribution of political support by adjusting agency policy accordingly. 
An additional feature of the model is that the process may 
work in reverse. Agency policy may alter to include benefits for a 
new mass-based group once the group begins to participate electorally 
on the issue. The model is called the political cycles model because 
the agency's response to changes in the political environment may bring 
it through a natural cycle. 
Chapter 5, "Issues, Pref e rences, and Public Policy," shows 
that a mass movement supporting regulat ion is unstable. This induces 
the cycle in agency policy making. Since the agency alters the 
distribution of its benefits in r esponse to changes in the distribution ' 
of political support, a cycle in the formation and decline of a mass 
5 
movement induces a similar cycle in agency policy. This process is 
applied to regulation in chapter 6, "The Political Cycles of Agency 
Policy Making." 
Part III, "Empirical Studies of Five Regulatory Arenas," 
presents five case studies. Chapter 7, "The Congressional Budgetary 
Process: Regulatory Agency Policy and Behavior," develops an empirical 
test based on the budgetary patterns expected by each hypothesis. 
This chapter argues that benefiting unorganized groups is necessarily 
more costly for the agency than benefiting organized industry groups. 
Since each hypothesis predicts a different distribution of benefits 
between organized and unorganized groups,legislative intent (on the 
distribution of benefits) should be observable in the agency's budget. 
The next five chapters apply this test to specific agencies, 
the Consumer. Product Safety Commission (Chapter 8), the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (Chapter 9), The Federal Trade Commis-
sion (Chapter 10), the Food and Drug Administration (Chapter 11), and 
the Atomic Energy Commission and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Chapter 
12). The results are preliminary; they indicate the influence of 
un~rganize~ groups in several caseS". The political cycles view more 
adequately describes agency policy making in all casas but the FDA. 
None of the hypotheses proved satisfactory in the latter case. 
6 
PART I 
THE PROBLEM 
7 
CHAPTER 2 
VIEWS ON REGULATORY AGENCY CAPTURE 
The postwar research on regulation has shown that the norma-
tive theory of the state implicit in welfare economics cannot explain 
the observed pattern of market intervention through independent regula-
tory commissions. When applied to regulat ion , this theory is referred 
to as the public interest theory. It asserts that the purpose of regula-
tion is to control the behavior of a set of ac tors in order to increase 
economic efficiency. The welfare of consumers, or a specific subset of 
consumers, is increased by redressing market failures. The literature 
on regulation is replete with studies showing that regulatory policies 
often have little to do with correcting market failures; instead agencies 
1 
are observed to favor .the groups they r egulate . Since the agencies 
benefit an industry at the expense of consumers, this form of market 
intervention poses a dilemma for the public i nterest theory as an 
explanatory model of the policy making process. 
Economists, theorizing about tbe political process which 
produced the independent commissions, have developed several models 
which address this dilemma. 2 Political scientists, studying a variety 
of policy areas including regulation have developed some which are also 
3 germane. All consider the political process a form of interest group 
aggregation. This conceptualization of policy making asserts that policy 
outcomes on anyone issue result from the interplay of groups which 
8 
express opinions on the issue. Some theories require that the groups 
be well organized in order to be influential (Stigler, Peltzman, and 
Edelman). Others allow diffuse groups to be influential if they 
participate electorally (Bernstein, McConnell). 
As various authors point out, a subgroup which does not partici-
pate in the policy making debate even though its welfare is affected by 
the policy issue, will not necessarily have its interests taken into 
account in the policy making process. 4 If a group does not participate, 
it does not generate political rewards. Political actors are responsive 
only to participating groups since their electoral fortunes (and other 
political rewards) are not affected by favoring nonparticipants. This 
constitutes the major difference between these theories and normative 
welfare economics. The latter requires consideration of the preferences 
of all citizens regardless of whether they have chosen to participate 
in the policy making debate. Under the various interest group theories, 
however, maximizing political actors will ignore nonparticipants. 
The purpose of this chapter is to define the major approaches 
that attempt to explain agency behavior. The discussion elucidates the 
inadequacies of both views, highlighting the need for a synthesis and 
a more general model. 
TWO APPROACHES TO POLICY MAKING 
Two major theories attempt to explain the observed favorability 
of regulatory agencies toward the groups they regulate. 5 The first is 
the cartel-by-design thesis. 6 This approach assumes that a producer 
group, wishing to escape the rigors of competition, uses the political > 
system for its own advantage, such as obtaining a cartel manager. 
9 
. According to this view, the relatively unorganized group of consumers 
does not affect policy outcomes on this issue. Consequently, .agencies 
are observed to pursue exactly the kinds of policies for which they 
were designed, namely, benefiting producer groups at the expense of 
consumers. The cartel-by-design thesis is also called the producer 
protection thesis to highlight the contrast with the consumer protection 
view of the public interest theories. 
The second thesis is the life cycle model of the regulatory 
7 
agency. This view argues that the political system imposes regulation 
upon an industry for the benefit of another group. In general, the 
second group is a mass reform movement, e.g., the Populist/Grange move-
ment which fought for the ICC, the Progressives who supported the 
creation of the FDA and the FTC, and, more recently, the various 
consumer movements which supported the CPSC. According to this 
hypothesis, the movement is responsible for the creation of the agency 
through the actions of its political representatives. Initially, 
members of the movement benefit from regulatory policies. However, over 
time the movement gradually fades, leaving no political constituency 
supporting effective regulation. Since the industry remains the only 
group generating rewards for political actors, representatives respond 
solely to this constituency. This allows the industry and its political 
allies to coopt the agency, forcing it to benefit the industry. 
The interesting feature of these two hypotheses is that the 
ultimate impetus for regulatory behavior is the same. Both conclude 
that the regulated industry will dominate agency policy making. 
McConnell, studying Federal policy making in agriculture, business, and 
10 
labor, argues a similar point. Capture-like behavior occurs with 
remarkable repetition, even though some agencies were organized by 
progressive reformers and others by the regulated group itself. 
The most curious feature of the independent commissions history 
is the degree to which these expressions of the Progressive drive 
have produced the same phenomena as agencies that emerged out of 
the orthodoxy of group self-de termination . The commissions 
have exhibited the same accommodation of governmental bureaus 
to the industries with which the y deal, sometimes even to the 
point of virtual fusion of public and private bodies. 8 
Therefore, observing that a regulatory agency benefits the 
,regulated actors at some time during the life of the agency cannot be 
construed as support for the cartel- by-design thesis. To distinguish 
between them the benefits of regulatory policy must be observed over 
the entire life of the ,agency. 
THE INADEQUACIES OF PREVIOUS WORK 
Several studies address the various capture hypotheses by 
studying the distribution of the benefits bestowed by agency policies. 
In their efforts to show that the textbook public interest theory of 
market intervention could not explain the observed pattern of regulatory 
policies, these scholars have not properly distinguished between the 
various hypotheses. In part because of these studies, the cartel-by-
design thesis is the most popular in the economics literatur& NOnetheless, 
these efforts have failed to substantiate the claims of support for the 
cartel-by-design thesis. 
Stigler's study of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
attempts to verify this hypothesis by testing it against a competing 
explanation. The second, a straw man, argues that 
11 
Regulation is instituted primarily for the protection and 
benefit of the public at large, or some subclass of the 
public. 9 
Implicitly assuming that all consequences of policy implementation are 
those intended by policy makers, Stigler observes the distribution of 
the benefits from agency policy making. Analysis of data on the ICC's 
policies in the 1920s and 1930s reveals that the agency protected 
the existing regulated carriers from a new source of competition, 
the trucking industry . Because the predictions of the public interest 
theory are not born out, he' rejects this view in favor of the cartel-
by-design thesis. 
However, this procedure doesn't rule out the life cycle 
hypothesis. Since the ICC was created in 1887, exhibiting that the 
industry received benefits from policy decisions thirty to forty years 
later is insufficient to show the agency was created for the industry. 
This methodological oversight can be rectified using data from the 
first decade of the ICC's operation. Spann and Erickson's work does 
just that. Their study has two results. 10 First, a component of 
consumer's surplus rose as short haul rates declined following the 
abolition of short haul/long haul rate differentials. Second, total 
surplus decreased because long haul prices were allowed to rise. 
Spann and Erickson conclude that the cartel-by-design hypothesis is 
confirmed. They argue that since the total surplus decreased, the 
general public could not be responsible for the agency's creation. 
Yet the conclusion doesn't follow since their counterthesis 
is inappropriate. Proponents of the hypothesis that a reform movement 
was responsible for the creation "of the ICC do not claim that all 
12 
1 h 1 · 11 consumers active y soug t regu atlon. Instead, these authors argue 
that only a subset of all consumers fought for railroad regulation, 
that is, the farmers of the Grange movement (or a coalition of farmers 
and merchants). 
. 12 
The recent work of Ulen also supports this interpretation. 
By tying the effectiveness of the railroad cartel (and hence the rise 
and fall of total surplus) to the business cycles he concludes that 
the ICC was superfluous during the period studied by Spann and Ericksen 
(1887-1893). Ulen's model predicts that the cartel would have regained 
its effectiveness without regulation because of the upswing in business 
activities. If his view is correct, then the real significance of 
Spann and Ericksen's work is to show that the only effect of the ICC 
was to benefit farmers and other groups who suffered from the short 
haul/long haul rate differentials. 
In the l880s farmers composed a majority of the population 
in the United States. The above interpretation of Stigler, Spann and 
Ericksen, and Ulen shows that the welfare of this politically important 
and numerically large subclass of the public may have actually improved 
as a result of the ICC. Since studies of later periods find little 
benefits from the ICC's policies other than to the various regulated 
groups, this reinterpretation means the life cycle hypothesis cannot 
b 1 d . 1 1 . fl' 13 Y ru e out as a potentla exp anatlon 0 regu atlon. 
However, the life cycle view has inadequacies as well. 
They fall into two categories. The first follows from the host of 
regulatory arenas which it ca~~ot explain. Two examples which will 
be studied in later chapters are the renaissance of antitrust and 
13 
consumer protection activity by the Federal Trade Commission after 
years of protecting small business from competitive forces ( see 
Chapter 10); and the influence of the environmental groups on the 
distribution of nuclear power r eactors · following two decades of 
regula tory policy beneficial solely to the industrial groups . I n this 
v e in, Owen and Braeutigam14 also mentions the recent policy changes 
of the CAB improving consumer benefits, and the Federal Communication 
Commiss ion fostering competition with the Bell System since 1965. In 
fact, ne ither hypothesis allows for the behavior exhibited by these 
agencies: a reorientation of agency policy from actions benefi ting 
only an industry to others providing grea t e r benefits for consumers. 
The life cycle approach has a second inadequacy; it lacks 
a mechanism by which agency policy decays from public benefit to pro-
ducer b enef it. Bernstein originally presented this thesis in terms 
15 
of an organi c view of the agency. Following its "birth," the agency 
enjoyed a "vigorous youth"; at this time the agency actively r egulated 
the indus try i n the public interes t . "Old age" and the "hardening of 
the arteries" then sets in, whence the agency succumbs to the interests 
of the regula ted actors. Though Bernstein notes the parallel between 
16 the change in policy choice and the political support the mechanism 
by which the political system affects the agency policy r emains 
unspecified. 
Perhaps Bernstein had an interest group aggregation model in 
mind. Agency policy reflects the d i stribution of support for a nd 
against r egulation. Initally a mass r e f orm movement is sufficiently 
strong to gain an agency for its benefit. However, as the movement 
14 
fades, the distribution of political support shifts against effective 
regulation, and agency policy becomes dominated by the sole interest 
group remaining, the industry. 
This interpretation leaves the fading of the mas s-movement 
unexplained. Further, if an interest group aggregation approach 
underlies the life cycle, why must it always work this way? 
Interpreting the cartel-by-design view within this framework, 
the results of an agency created in response to demand from producers 
ought to benefit this group as long as they remain the sole source of 
political support on the issue . As another scenario, suppose an agency 
originally designed to benefit producers becomes the focus of public 
attention. Shouldn't its policies, according to the interest group 
aggregation approach, change as a result of the redistribution of 
political support for regulation? If this is the mechanism which 
underlies Bernstein's life cycle, then this pattern is only one of many 
potential scenarios describing agency policy making. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has reviewed the two major capture hypotheses 
in the literature, namely, the cartel-by-design thesis and the life 
cycle thesis. Both were ·shown to be too inflexible to allow for the 
wide range of regulatory policies observed; the first because agencies 
are sometimes observed to regulate producers to benefit nonindustry 
groups, and the second because agencies are sometimes observed to 
undergo a policy renaissance ( reversal of the life cycle process). 
The final discussion set the stage for further work. By 
15 
interpreting both views in terins of the interest-group-aggregation 
framework, they are indicated to be special cases of a more general view 
of the policy making process. 17 This approach "'ill be returned to in 
Part II which presents a model of policy making that al101<s agencies 
to respond to all participating groups. The model exhibits a mechanism 
by which policy reflects the distribution of preferences expressed by 
political groups. A major result is, that as the participating groups 
change so will agency policy. 
16 
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model of agency policy change which allows response to the 
changes in policy environment. Previous models do not allow 
sufficient variation in policy outcome in response to changes 
in the political environment. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ECONOMICS OF SAFETY: IS THERE MARKET FAILURE? 
Economists have widely differing views about market per-
formance on the dimension of safety. One view is that variations in 
risks reflect a market's response to varying tastes and attitudes 
towards risks. Some individuals are willing to pay for safety; 
others are less risk averse and choose to buy cheaper, but riskier 
products. Firms compete on the basis of price and quality, and an 
unrestricted market maximizes consumers' freedom of choice among 
alternatives. Any restriction on consumer choice, if binding, is 
Pareto dominated by a world with no restrictions, since some individuals 
would prefer .to buy products with a price/quality combination which 
has been ruled out. 
On the other hand, another .view holds that market pressure 
decreases product safety levels forcing firms to provide too little 
safety and thus hurting consumers. This view models safety in terms of 
uncertainty. Consumers are not likely to learn all the relevant infor-
mation about certain classes of commodities (e.g., goods which are 
purchased infrequently) on the basis of their experiences . According to 
this approach, low probability events may go undetected. A firm which 
manufactures products without the defect · responsible for the event 
has higher costs than firms which manufacture products with the defect,l 
and cannot survive in a competitive market . A role exists for restric-
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tions on product design, according to this view, since consumers are 
bearing risks unknowingly. 
The two approaches reach opposite conclusions about market 
performance on the safety dimension. It is troublesome that economic 
theory can be used to derive such divergent conclusions. ifuat accounts 
for this discrepancy? Is there a role for market intervention to improve 
consumer welfare? 
This chapter addresses this discrepancy by restating the 
question. It argues that there are three types of models of the safety 
problem according to whether safety is considered a quality variable 
(no uncertainty or risk), a risky variable (but no uncertainty; all 
probability distributions are known), or an uncertainty variable (prob-
abilities may not be fully known by all individuals). The real issue 
is which model best characterizes the world in which we live. 
The role of information is the key factor distinguishing the 
three interpretations of safety. The two opinions presented at the 
outset differ along this dimension. In the first, consumers knowingly 
choose to bear the risks of less safe products; in the second, they do 
not. The conclusions about market performance vary with the amount 
of information. Under full information, competition leads to the 
desired result of maximiz'ing consumer sovereignty. When information 
is lacking, however, market forces lead to a decrease in safety; 
consumers do not necessarily respond to safety improvements because 
of the lack of information. 
The three approaches to product safety discussed here belong 
to the neoclassical, the probabilistic, and the differential information 
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paradigms. The first models safety as a quality dimension, not a 
risky dimension. 2 Firms compete along this dimension as they do on 
any other. Since full information reigns in the neoclassical world, 
all actors know the consequences of their choices. ~furkets provide 
an optimal amount of diversity; products with less safety are provided 
because some consumers prefer the combination of less safety and 
lower price to the combination of greater safety and higher price. 
The second approach treats safety as a risky dimension . 
. Products vary in the degree to which they produce harmful or beneficial 
side effects. A stable probability distribution governs product 
variability,and all consumers know the distribution. The results about 
market performance from the neoclassical world carryover into this 
3 
world. Because consumers have full information about the risks they 
choose to bear (or avoid), competition induces firms to make the 
appropriate decisions along this dimension. Improvements in product 
safety have known consequences on the probability distribution of a 
firm's product since consumers are assumed to have full information. 
Consequently, the market rewards firms which make improvements if 
there is a demand for greater safety. 
The final approach interprets safety in the context of 
economic actors who have differential amounts of information. Products 
vary in the extent of their side effects. Individual actors are assumed 
to have some, but not necessarily full, information about the set of 
possible events (and their probability distributions) associated with 
. d 4 a glven pro uct. 
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If the mechanism by which consumers acquire information relies 
heavily on individual experience, consumers are likely , to approximate 
the second (probabilistic) world in the category of frequently purchased 
products. Products, which are only seldomly purchased, present problems 
for consumers since the tails of the distribution are difficult to 
ascertain . The chances of rare, but very damaging events may be 
seriously underestimated since they are observed so "infrequently . 
The conclusions about the market performance in the "neoclassical 
and probabilistic approaches do not carryover into the third view . 
Firms do not face the proper incentives to fully compete on the dimension 
of safety in certain markets. The systematic lack of information 
about unsafe events makes it difficult for firms to internalize the 
5 benefits from improvements which reduce the chances of these events . 
Firms will produce too little safety in the competitive but uncertain 
world. 6 
The following examples highlight the distinctions among the 
various worlds. The first is kitchen knives . Knives are inherent l y 
risky, and may cause accidents because they are sharp. When consumers 
use knives, however, they knowingly bear the risk of cutting their 
fingers. Mandating dull knives to decrease the risk simply decreases 
the product ' s usefulness. Since consumers are awar"e of the relation-
ship between unfortunate occurrences and their use of the knife, no 
welfare gains would result from this regulatory action . 
This conclusion does not follow in the case of television 
sets, the second example. There are about 100,000,000 televisions sets 
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in the U.S. Each year there are about 100 cases in which the television 
blows up. Data compiled from a series of years reveal that brands 
blow up differentially. Yet few consumers are likely to learn the 
relative frequencies of such rare events on the basis of their own 
experiences. Product restrictions in this case may make consumers 
better off by removing a risk they unknowingly bear. 
An interesting feature of these models is that each subsumes 
the previous model as a special case. The differential information 
. world reduces to the probabilistic world, if consumers gain enough 
information about product performance to make choices based on near 
perfect estimates of the probabilities of the various events. The second 
world reduces to the first if probabilities are either considered 
~relevent (i.e., safety is modeled as quality) or if the probability 
distribution collapses to a ·single point of degree of safety for each 
product. 
Thus, the issue is not whether economic theory contains a 
rationale for safety regulation. The issue is whether the operation 
of informational production and transmission mechanisms prevents the 
uncertain world from collapsing into the probabilistic world. If such 
mechanisms function properly, the market will approximate the 
probabilistic (or even the neoclassical) world; competition will 
produce an optimal amount of diversity in product quality. If such 
mechanisms do not function well or do not exist, then competitive 
market performance.will underproduce safety.7 
This thesis studies several safety regulatory arenas. While 
the above discussion has not resolved the underlying issue, it does 
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suggest how agencies mandated to improve safety can benefi t consumers. 
A rationale for ma rket intervention (regulation), if one exists, 
dictates which products should be subject to intervention and which 
events are to be prevented . Those products for which consumers acquire 
adequate information to make knowledgeable decisions among various 
alternatives should not b e subject to intervention, while probability, 
damaging or disastrous events should be considered for intervention. 
The theoretical model of the regulatory process presented 
in Part II builds on the features ·of this market failure. This chapter 
has studied how the public sector can, in principle, improve consumer 
welfare. Parts II and· III study the the public sector's action in 
practice. 
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PART II 
REGULATORY AGENCY CAPTURE 
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CHAPTER 4 
A MODEL OF THE REPRESENTATIVE LEGISLATURE 
The purpose of this chapter is to exhibit a mode l of the policy 
making process. The following chapters apply the model to the issue of 
regulatory agency capture . This yields the political cycles view of 
agency policy making, which shows that regulatory policy responds to 
all participating groups in the political environment. Further, agency 
policy making is responsive to changes in the political environment 
(e.g., increases or decreases in the support for or the opposition 
to regulation). As the first step in the cycle, it will be shown 
that even if a mass movement of consumers is the source of the demand 
for regulation (rather than the industry ' itself), the agency may 
nevertheless be captured by the industry if the movement dies. This 
demonstrates that the cartel-by-design thesis is not a necessary 
feature of a political system whose poliCies are observed to benefit 
an industry nominally being regulated in the '.lpuhlic interest. 11 
An additional feature of the model is that the process may 
work in reverse. In the second step of the cycle, a captured agency 
may be revitalized. If public concern over a particular regulated 
activity increases, agency policy may change to partially or wholly 
accommodate these interes ts. The model thus provides a potential 
explanation for several regulatory agencies which are curiously 
ignored in the capture literature; for example, the Federal Trade 
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Commission following its reorganization in 1969-1971 or the Atomic 
Energy Commission (and later the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) 
following the successful intervention of the environmentalists in 
the Calvert Cliffs case during the early 1970s. 
The approach taken here differs in another respect with 
the previous work by economists on regulation. l The results of 
the model are derived from an explicit formulation of the political 
process. Further, it attempts to incorporate those features of the 
policy making process which political scientists have identified as 
the salient features influencing policy formation. Specifically, 
a representative legislature is introduced. Both the electoral 
mechanism by which individual representatives are chosen and the 
legislative committee system are shown to play crucial roles in agency 
captures. Since these agencies are created by the United States 
Congress, the details incorporated into the model are meant to mimic 
various institutions associated with this legislative body.2 
The first two sections of the chapter present the mechanism 
for collective choice decisions. The first details the electoral 
process. Based on the Downsian election, this process induce~ a set 
of preference goals for each representative to pursue in the legisla-
ture. The second section contains the legislative rules for public 
policy information. The committee system is a central feature of the 
legislative institutions. The final section rationalizes these rules 
by showing that maximizing legislators prefer a committee system to an 
unmodified majority rule institution. The following chapters derive 
the political cycles model of agency policy making from the results 
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of this section. 
THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS 
The model of the policy making process explored in this 
section extends the Downsian electoral framework in a natural way to 
subsume a representative legislature.3 Previous models conceptualize 
the policy making process as a single elected official, responsible 
to the entire electorate. All citizens participate in the same 
election to choose the policy maker, voting for the candidate whose 
policy stands afford them the highest utility. As an equilibrium 
model of electoral competition, the Downsian process induces a set 
of policy preferences for the elected official which are based on 
the distribution of preferences in the electorate. Public policies 
are formed after the election as the policy maker implements the 
stands taken in the previous campaign. 
The model presented in this section embodies the policy 
making process in a representative legislature. The political 
economy is divided into N subelectorates so that the single Downsian 
election is replaced by N independent, simultaneous aoI~sian elections, 
each choosing a representative who becomes one participant in the 
legislature. Public policies then result from representatives pursuing 
their induced preferences according to the rules of the legislature. 
The social choice mechanism for the political economy is 
then fully described once the institutional rules of the legislature 
are defined. These rules aggregate the electorally induced prefer-
ences of the representative into public policies. 
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The first part of this chapter reviews the relevant features 
of the Downsian election, including the modifications necessary to 
incorporate N elections. This is followed by the Downsian theorem 
which characterizes the policy stands of maximizing candidates. The 
second part of the chapter describes the rules of the legislature. 
The reciprocity theorem, which explains why maximizing legislators 
would choose these rules, further elucidates the behavior of 
representatives. 
THE ELECTORAL MECFUU1ISM 
The political economy is divided into N nonoverlapping 
geographic units called districts. Each district contains liN of all 
citizens and has one representative in the legislature who is chosen 
in a local election campaign. Citizens participate only in their 
own district's campaign and are assumed to vote for the candidate 
whose policy stands yield them the highest expected utility. 
Candidates competing for election to the legislature are assumed to 
4 
maximize the probability of their election. The choice variables 
under their control are the positions each advocates on the 'various 
policy issues. Since citizens have different preferences over policy 
outcomes 1 candidates must choose their stands to induce citizens to 
vote for them. Given a number of assumptions about the distribution 
of opinions in each district, electoral competition leads to an 
equilibrium choice of the policy stands advocated by maximizing 
candidates. 
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Consider the jth electoral campaign (i.e., the election in 
district j). There exists a set of policy issues over which 
candidates compete. The set of issues is parameterized as a 
Euclidean space, Lj , and is assumed to be exogenously determined. Each 
candidate, i, chooses a stand, l"k' to announce on each issue, k. 
1J 
The stand is one particular course of action out of many on this 
issue, and represents promises of policy measures to introduce, pursue, 
or support in the coming session of the legislature. The collection 
of stands taken by each candidate i 1 =(1 1 1 1 ) 
, ij .. ijl, ij2,····· ijk, •. 'ijm ' 
is an element of the space of district j (i.e., 1 .. ELj ). 
1J 
Since representatives are only one vote among many, citizens 
in district j discount candidate i's policy stands by the probability 
that he will be able to influence the outcome. S With probability Pj 
candidate i .wi11 be able to influence the decision of the legislature; 
in this case the policy outcome is 1 ... However, with probability 
1J 
(l-Pj ), the decision will be beyond the influence of this legislator 
and hence of his constituents; in this case, the decision of the 
legislature is some other outcome, ~K 
Citizens are assumed to vote for the candidate in their 
district who offers them the highest expected utility. Thus, citizens 
in district j face the following maximization problem: 
Max E(U) =U(l .. ).P. + U(L).(l-P.). 
i 1J J - J (1) 
Given these assumptions, together with other specific assumptions 
about the distribution of preferences of voters over policy issues in 
6 
each district, the DHO theorem establishes an equilibrium policy 
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choice for maximizing candidates. It asserts that candidates for a 
given seat will adopt the policy position most preferred by the 
median voter "in their district. This theorem applies to each district's 
campaign so that competition induces a set of policy preferences for 
all representatives. 
The induced preferences of various representatives will differ 
to the degree that issues vary in their saliency (marginal impact on the 
median voter) across districts. Further, the induced preferences need 
not be complete. Citizens of different districts may be concerned with 
. j' 
different issues -- i.e., LJ need not coincide with L (j # j'). 
Some issues may enter only one or a few local campaigns. Others, 
called national issues, may be part of all or nearly all campaigns. 
If an issue is not of concern in a given district, and is not likely 
to become one in future campaigns, then representatives cannot affect 
their own electoral fortunes by shaping the policy outcomes on 
this issue. Consequently, maximizing representatives will concentrate 
their time and effort on influencing policy choi~e on issues which 
are of concern in their district, The remainder of the chapter 
focuses on this concern~ 
RULES OF THE REPRESENTATIVE LEGISLATURE 
Following their electoral success, representatives are 
designated as members of the legislature. Public policies for the 
political economy result from representatives pursuing their induced 
goals within the confines of the legislative rules. The commit-
tee system, which dominates policy development, is the main feature 
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of the legislature. The remainder of this section describes the 
committee system and hm. it serves member electoral goals and 
affects policy formation. 
Public policy making . is conceptualized as a two-stage process. 
In the first stage, the legislature considers various policy alter-
natives for enactment; in the second, it implements and manages on-
going policies and programs which were enacted in previous legislative 
sessions. The operational difference b e tween the two s tages is that, 
in the first stage, legislators attempt· to influence which programs 
are chosen, that is, whether a specific program should be enacted. In 
the second stage, they consider the actual distribution of the benefits 
and costs, given that the program has passed. This process interprets 
and implements the broad mandate and legislative goals into detailed 
policy. 
The following examples highlight the distinction between the 
two legislative stages. First, consider the traditional pork barrel. 
This system distributes projects in which the costs exceed the benefits 
so that the entire program costs more than it yields. Once this system 
is in place, however, it is individually rational for legislators to 
seek projects for their districts since the costs are spread over all 
districts through general taxation while the benefits are concentrated 
in their district. 7 In the first stage of the legislative process, 
representatives voting on the continuation of the system might disman-
tle ;i:t since society as a whole loses by this systeIl). However, in 
the secol1:d stage, continuation is not an issue; rather, the concern 
is which districts will-receive projects (i.e., the system's benefits). 
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An antipoverty program serves as a second example. In the 
first stage, the legislature decides whether the public sector should 
attempt to alleviate poverty . I n the second, assuming the proposal 
passes, legis lators decide on the actual distribution of the program' s 
benefits among the various distric t s , and oversee the a dministration 
of the day-to-day operation of the program. 
The Committee system divides policy issues into subgroups. 
Each committee, or subset of legis lators, is delegated the tasks of 
policy formation within its .substantive (policy) jurisdiction in both 
stages of the legislative process . In the first stage the committee 
must scrutinize all proposals submitted to the legislature that fall 
within its subgroup. Judgment as to their merit must be rendered. 
Rather than require all members to study every proposal, the committee 
is delegated the responsibility to screen out those which are unaccept-
able as legislation. 
Delegation to scrutinize a ll proposals in their area gives 
the committee members veto power over all proposals within their 
jurisdiction. This becomes the first institutional rule of the 
legislative committee system: 
Rl: No legislation will b e considered for enac tment 
by the legislature unless it is proposed by the 
committee with jurisdiction over the issue. 
The second rule requires approval of a majority of all legislators 
for any proposal to be enacted. 
R2: All proposed legislation must be approved by a 
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majority of legislators for enactment as a 
public policy. 
Veto power CRl) allows members of a given committee a 
degree of discretion over policy choices in their area. It can be 
used to block measures which committee members do not like, independent 
of the measure's support among all other legislators. Further, since 
many different proposals on a given issue may command a majority of 
votes when pitted against the status quo, members of the committee can 
choose that proposal (out of all which beat the status quo) which best 
8 
suits their interest through contr'ol of the agenda. 
The second task of the committee system is the management and 
oversight of ongoing legislative and bureaucratic programs within 
its jurisdiction. In previous legislative sessions, policies and 
programs have been enacted which continue operation. The committee 
i s responsible for control and operation of these programs. At this 
stage, l egislators can influence policy choice through the administra-
tion process rather than the legislative procesq. Majority approval 
is not required for action at this stage, thus affording committee 
members another degree of policy discretion. 
R3: Policy oversight and control is delegated to the 
appropriate committee and is not subject to majority 
rule approval by the whole body. 
The final rule of the legislature describes the process which 
assigns legislators to the various committees. To the degree that is 
possible, members are allowed to join committees which oversee 
policies of relevance to their districts. This increases the 
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marginal impact of the representative on the utility of his constituents. 
The next section elaborates this rationale in greater detail. The 
final rule of the legislature is: 
R4: Representatives may join the committee of their choice. 9 
LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS AND MEMBER GOALS: THE RECIPROCITY THEOREM 
Two rationales support the development of a committee system' 
within the legislature. The first argues that committees are essential 
.for policy formation. Since a legislature addresses large numbers 
of issues in a given session, little progress can be made if each 
iegislator must pay attention to every detail. Specialization allows 
many issues to be addressed simultaneously. Policy areas often involve 
complicated issues which require detailed study. The development of 
expertise facilitates the number of issues which can be adequately 
handled. Furthermore, the time and effort invested by individuals 
duplicated if the me~ber returns to the same committee in the next 
session. 
Specialization and reciprocity serve as the incentive system 
to support individual investment in a narrow.field of expertise. 
Reciprocity is the process by which legislators agree to yield influence 
in areas outside their committee's jurisdiction for greater influence 
10 
over policies within their jurisdiction. Without an increase in 
influence over policy choice, such as embodied in Rl, committee 
members would not invest time and effort studying problems and pro-
posals or writing legislation in their policy area. If their work 
could easily be undone by other legislators who had not invested any 
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time in the issue, their own efforts would be wasted; the time could> 
perhaps, have been used more effectively elsewhere, such as undoing 
the work of other members in another policy area. 
The committee system, from the viewpoint of the first 
rationale, represents a division of labor in the sense of Adam Smith. 
All legislators benefit from the capacity to consider several issues 
simultaneously and from the improved ability of each committee to 
scrutinize proposals within its policy area. Of course, allowing 
legislators who have the greatest stake in an issue the greatest 
influence over policy choice will bias the final outcome.ll For example, 
agricultural policy is more likely to benefit producers if representa-
tives from agricultural districts write farm policy than if representa-
tives from consumer districts (or consumer and farming districts) write 
the legislation. 
The second rationale for the committee system argues that it 
serves members' goa1s. l2 The committee system with r e ciprocity allows 
a subset of legislators some discretion (and greater personal influence) 
over policy formation within its jurisdiction. To the degree that 
policy issues ~ystematically vary across districts, representatives 
can improve their electoral security from an institution which allows 
them to trade influence over issues not of concern in their district 
for greater influence over those issues which are of local concern. 
This rationale requires that representatives be allowed to 
join committees whose policy areas are of greatest concern in their 
own distri·ct. . As the reciprocity theorem shows (see Appendix), median . 
voters prefer their representative to have mQre influence over issues 
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with a high marginal impact on their utility. A representative who 
joins a committee irrelevant to the concerns of his constituents may 
do them little good. 
The reciprocity theorem formalizes the notion that the commit-
tee system serves member~ electoral goals. The actual presentation is 
contained in the Appendix; the intuitive argument follows. The discus-
sion focuses on why this rationalizes rules Rl - R4. 
Noll and Fiorina13 derive the following comparative static 
result from the consumer maximization problem (see equation (1) above), 
an increase in a representative's influence over the policy outcome 
increases the expected utility of the median 
hence improves his electoral security (i.e. , 
voter 
dE{U} 
dP. ] 
in his district , and 
> 0). The 
reciprocity theorem is similar in spirit and can be described as 
follows. The structure of the Downsian election (as .formalized by 
Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook) 14 allows issues to vary in their marginal 
impact on the median voter's utility. Define a legislator's influence 
over policy outcomes in terms of the ex ante probability that he will 
be able to influence the outcome of a vote over the issue. Then
1 
from 
an ex ante standpoint, if a legislator trades away' influence over an 
issue with low marginal impact on his median voter for an equal 
increase on an issue with greater marginal impact, he has increased 
his median voter's expected utility. 
The committee which oversees the issue with the highest 
marginal impact on his district's median voter is the most attractive 
15 
for the representative. Rl and R3 support the redistribution of 
influence of the various issues embodied in the reciprocity system. 
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The former rule enhances committee influence in the first legislative 
stage (agency and policy crea tion) while the latter rule improves 
influence in the oversight process, R4 ensures that rec iprocity will 
work to the advantage of l egislators by allm'ing them to join the 
committee of their choice. These rules allow the system of specializa-
tion (which the first rationale argued is a n ecessary feature of 
legislation) to benefit individual representatives (as argued by the 
second rationale). 
Finally, this result allows inferences to be made about 
policy change. As the issues in local election campaigns vary over 
time, the relative attractiven.ess of the diff e rent committees change, 
leading to turnover in committee membership, and to changes in the 
preferences expressed by the remaining committee members. This process 
has important policy consequences,. as Chapter 6 will show . New 
members of a committee are likely to have different preferences than 
the members they replace. R3 assures members that the oversight 
process can be used to influence policy in directions which are more 
in accord with the makeup of the policy goals expressed by the changed 
committ ees . So, in general, as membership changes, so will agency 
policy. 
After modeling the·regulatory setting, the next two chapters 
explore the implications of this phenomena for regulatory policy. 
Chapter 5 defines the political context of safety regulation and 
its implications for the creation of a regulatory agency. Chapter 
6 follows with the study of the evolution of committee policy 
choice in response to change in the political environment of r egulation. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER FOUR 
The appendix presents three results: 
1. b~e equivalence of the consumer maximization problem presented in 
16 
this chapter and the usual Downsian/DHO case, 
2. the Noll and Fiorina comparative statics result on the relation-
ship between a representative's influence and his constituent's 
utility, 
3. the reciprocity theorem. 
1. The consumer maximization problem is, 
Max E(U) = U(l .. ).P. + U(L) · (l-P.)· 
1J J - J (1) 
Tbe index j names the, vater's district and can be ignored; i is the 
index over candidates. The usual voter problem in the DHO election is 
Max E(D) 
i 
= D(l.)· 
1 
To show the desired result, simply notice that equation (1) is a 
(2) 
linear transformation of equation (2). D(L)· (l-P.) is a constant, and 
,. - J 
mUltiplying D(li) by P j doesn't affect the choice of Ii so long as Pj>O. 
2. Noll and Fiorina17 study a model with a voter maximiza-
tion problem similar to equation (1). They derive the following com-
parative static result. If P j is the probability that legislator j will 
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cast the deciding vote on this issue, and U(x) is the utility function 
of the median voter in district j, then, 
oE(U(x)) 
oP. 
J 
> O. 
That is, at equilibrium, the median voter prefers his district to h ave 
greater influence over legis l ative outcomes. 
The DHO theorem asserts that candidates will adopt the 
policy positions which represent the most preferred point of the 
median voter. Let this point be 1*. The median voter's expected 
utility is 
E(U(X)) ~ U(l*) . P j + U(!,) (l-P j ). 
By definition, U(l*) is greater than rE~FI (for all ~ not equal to 1*), 
and the result follows. 
3. The following is - a. simple version of the reciprocity 
theorem. Assume: 
AI: Ex ante, in a majority rule legislature, each legislator has 
an equal probability, lin, of casting the deciding vote on 
any given issue (where n is the number of legislators). Votes 
on distinct issue dimensions are assumed to be independent 
events. 
A2: - In a legislative committee system, each committee decides 
issues within its policy area only. Ex ante, each leg islator 
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on committee k has a probability l/~ of casting the deciding 
vote on committee k's issue (where uk is the number of 
members on conunittee k). 
A3: There are only two issues and two committees. of equal size. 
Committee one decides issue one and committee two decides 
issue two. Further, representatives are each members of only 
one committee,and each committee operates by majority rule. 
A4: Consider the representative from district i. His induced 
preference function over policies, (xl ,x2), is 
i 
U (x) ~ 
-i (x 1 
, 
-i 
x Z) is district its median voter's most preferred 
issue position (see DHO theorem). 
AS: Ex ante, assume each legislator i presumes that there exists 
some expected distance from his most preferred point which 
o represents the policy outcome x. 
l 
ture such that 
o 0 (xiI, x i2 ) of the Iegisla-
A6: ail> a i2 (i.e., in district i, issue 1 is more salient than 
issue 2 in a marginal utility sense); further, legislator i 
joins committee 1. 
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Reciprocity Theorem (simple version): The expected utility 
for legislator i is greater under a legislative committee 
system than under majority rule. 
Proof: 
Under majority rule, 
Under a legislative committee system 
2 Cl-~F Yi (al +a2)] EU ~ -[0: Yf2 + LC n 
EU EU 1 (al -a2) > o. ~ LC M n 
This simple version of the reciprocity theorem can be generalized in 
several directions, for example, to the case of more than two issues, 
to having the ex ante probabilities of affecting the outcome be unequal 
(e.g., as in a seniority system), to committees of unequal size, to 
nonadditive utility functions, etc. In all cases conditions can be 
obtained in which a committee system is preferable to majority rule. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1. The one exception is Sam Peltzman, "Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation, II Center for the Study of American 
Business Working Paper no. 10 (St. Louis: Washington 
University, 1976). 
2. The model of the representative legis lature presented in this 
chapter is not an attempt to model the United States Congress. 
It studies the impact of specific institutions on regulatory 
agency policy. Though thes e are essential components of 
Congress, many salient features are i gnored (for example, the 
bicameral division between the House and the Senate, the 
seniority system, the party system, etc.). Further, the model 
ignores the influence of the president (and the executive branch) 
on the behavior of repres entatives and agencies except for 
passing references . 
3. For an exposition of the Downsian election, see Anthony Downs, 
An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 
1957); or William Riker and Peter Ordeshook, An Introduction 
to Positive Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
1973). For a formal exposition of the model with proofs, see 
Otto A. Davis, Helvin J. Hinich , and Peter Ordeshook, "An 
Expository Development of a Hathematical Hodel of the Electoral 
Process," American Politica l Science Review 64 (1970):426. 
4. See the Introduction and Pa rt I, which discusses the advantages 
and limitations of assuming this single purpose behavior, in 
David Hayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Have n: 
Yale University Press, 1974). A general discussion of l egis-
lator's goals is found in Richard F. Fenno, Congressmen in 
Committees (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972) . 
5. Roger G. Noll and Morris P. Fiorina, "Voters, Legislators, and 
Bureaucrats: A Rational Choice Interpretation of the Growth 
of Bureaucracy," mimeographed (Stanford University, 1976). 
6. Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, "Hodel of the Electoral Process." 
7. Assuming that taxation spreads the costs evenly over all 
districts, then even if b<c, as long as b>*c, this district 
accrues net benefit from the inefficient project (b = b enefits, 
c = cost, n = number of districts). See Barry R. Weingast, flA 
Rational Choice Interpretation of Congressional Norms, 11 Social 
Science Working Paper no. 142 (Pasadena: California Institute 
of Technology, 1976), for a detailed discussion. 
46 
8. For a discussion on the use of the agenda to control outcomes, 
see Charles R. Plott and Michael E. Levine, "A Mod e l of Agenda 
Influence on Committee Decisions," Social Science Working Paper 
no. 143 (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1976). 
Also see Linda R. Cohen, "Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting 
Models," mimeographed (Pasadena: California Institute of 
Technology, 1977). 
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Representatives, see Nicholas Masters, "Committee Assignments 
in the House of Representatives," American Political Science 
Review (1961); Kenneth Shepsle, "Congressional Committ ee Assign-
ments: An Optimization Model with Institutional Constraints," 
Public Choice 22 · (1975) :55-78; and idem, The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: 
The Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Represen-
t a tives (Chicago: University of Chicago, forthcoming). In 
addition to describing the operation of this system, they show 
how it serves members' goals by attempting to grant each 
representative membership on the committee of his choice. 
10. For the history and development of this practice in the House of 
Representatives, see George B. Galloway and Sidney Wise, History 
of the House of Repres entatives (New York: Crowell, 1976). For 
other discussions of this rationale, see George Goodwin, The 
Little Legislature: Committees of Congress (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1970); and Richard F. Fenno, Power of the 
Purse: . Appropriations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1966). 
11. For a detailed discussion of the reciprocity system and how it 
affects committee policy discretion in the House of Represen-
tatives, see Fenno, Power of the Purse; and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., 
The Congressional Process, Strategies, Rules, and Procedures 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1972). This institution in the Senate 
is described in Donald R. Mathews , United States Senators and 
Their World (New York: Vintage, 1960). Also see Nelson Polsby , 
IrThe Institutionalization of the House of Representatives,1r 
American Political Science Revie" (1968), for a perspective on 
reciprocity. 
12. A central argument of Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1969). 
13. Roger G. Noll and Morris P. Fiorina, "Voters, Legislators, and 
Bureaucrats." 
14. DaVis, Hinich, and Ordes hook, "Mode l of the Electoral Process." 
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15. Fenno, Congressmen in Committees, contains the best . discussion 
of how the committee system serves - the various goals of legis-
lators, and why different committees systematically attract 
members from different types of districts. Also compare Mayhew, 
Congress: The Electoral Connection. 
16. Downsian/DHO refers to spatial models of electoral competition, 
as formalized by Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook. See Downs, 
Economic Theory of Democracy; and Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, 
"Model of the Electoral Process." 
17. Noll and Fiorina, "Voters, Legislators, and Bureaucrats." 
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CHAPTER 5 
ISSUES, PREFERENCES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
This chapter analyzes the response of the policy making 
process, as modeled in the previous chapter, to a mass movement among 
citizens in the political economy. The movement studied is assumed 
to support government regulation to redress a market failure. The 
economic actors whose behavior is to be regulated (and their political 
representatives) are assumed to oppose market intervention. Representa-
tives who attempt to enact these policies reflect the movement's 
strength among their constituents. Under a number of assumptions 
which lead to the creation of an agency mandated to redress a market 
failure, it 18 shown that once the mass movement.dies, the agency will 
benefit the actors it regulates rather than members of the original 
mass movement. 
Essentially, mass movements raise issues which affect voters' 
preferences. The first part of this chapter describes the circumstances 
under which issues and preferences diverge. The concern is twofold. 
First, why don't movements automatically form to internalize potential 
gains; and second, why might the movement fade despite the loss in 
benefits which may follow? The second part of the chapter contains 
the assumptions underlying the creation of the regulatory agency. 
THE PARADOX OF PUBLIC POLICY FORMATION 
The model in the previous chapter showed that as campaign 
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issues evolve the preferences expressed by representatives change 
accordingly. Issues may vary over time for two reasons. First, 
preferences themselves may change. Second issues may vary though 
preferences are fixed. This chapter explores the factors which account 
for the discrepancy between the set of issues and the set of policy 
variables available to the legislature. These factors are rational 
ignorance and a prisoner's dilemma faced by vote~s in all districts. 
To develop the context of the rational ignorance, consider an 
election in which there are 'many issues, and suppose that individuals 
vote on the basis of only partial information about the policy positions 
of each candidate. Why would a voter remain only partially informed 
when ignorance may lead him to vote against the candidate whose entire 
platform offers the voter the highest utility? Since an individual 
voter is only one vote among many in his district, the probability 
that his vote affects the final outcome is small. The potential benefits 
from greater information must be discounted by the tiny probability 
that his vote will make a difference. Further, more information is 
costly; investment in information may not be worthwhile when weighed 
against the change in expected benefits. Therefore, individuals may 
rationally choose to vote on the basis of incomplete information about 
a candidate's policy stands. l 
The other factor which contributes to the discrepancy between 
preferences and issues arises from a prisoner's dilemma imposed by 
the districting mechanism. EVen if voters in one district bear the 
costs of information and subsequently raise a new issue in their 
own campaign, they would change only one vote within the legislature. 
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Unless many districts undertake the investment simultaneously, 
legislative action may never follow. 2 
Both factors combine to make the relationship between more 
informed decisions and individual utility improvement very remote. 
Consequently, the number of issues pursued by the entire legislature 
is likely to be smaller than the set of issues relevant to the ,,,elfare 
of individuals in a given district. 
This situation creates a paradox. To initiate public policy 
formation, support for a particular position must exist across many 
districts in order to generate electoral rewards for representative 
action. Yet this requires solving the public goods problem inherent in 
the prisoner's dilemma imposed by the districting mechanism. Since 
no one district gains from initiating action without the support of 
many others, the public goods problem must be overcome by voters prior 
to action by the public sector. 
Because action in one district alone is unlikely to alter 
policy, the existence of gains from public action does not constitute 
a sufficient condition for action. Nevertheless, public issues do 
arise and enter many local campaigns. Public action benefiting dj~ffuse 
groups does occur. The dynamics of this process, particularly over-
coming the- two factors hi.ndering issue formation, are not fully under:"" 
stood and deserve further investigation. This chapter does not attempt 
to specify when an issue will form. When it does, however, the model 
of the legislature in the previous chapter explains legislative response. 
The final section of this chapter applies this to safety regulation. 
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WANING OF THE MOVEMENT 
Though necessary for policy formation, political support 
across many districts is unstable. Just as it was unlike ly to form 
in the fir s t place, it is unlikely to remain for long periods after 
policy initiation. Several factors contribute to the decline in public 
support. First, the public goods problem facing all districts remains, 
but in a new form. The l egislature, now under R3 instead of R2, 
requires only a handful of representatives on the oversight committee 
working to ensure the proper outcomes. Othe r legislators are free to 
pursue other policy matters; voters in other districts still benefit as 
long as support remains on the oversight committee. 
R4 and the reciprocity theorem e nsur e that the representatives 
who join the oversight committee are from those districts where regula-
tion has the .highest marginal impact. This contributes to a policy lag. 
If support eventually fades, the most dedicated followers are likely 
to be the last to give up. Because the most dedicated representatives 
join the committee, policy c hange lags behind changes in the distri-
bution of opinion in the full legislature. 
Another factor contributing to the decline in policy support 
is the large cost required by each individual to remain informed. 
The certain costs, when weighed against the c hange in expected benefit 
of remaining informed, are probably high enough to imply a decline in 
support. 
As support declines, electoral rewards are no longer generated 
and representatives from these districts pursue other matters. If 
a small, dedicated opposition exists and remains all along, it 
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may assume control over policy administration. The legislature, 
now in R3, allows a small number of legislators to alter policy 
outcomes. So, as support fades, the opposition may gain control to 
mitigate or reverse the original policy through the administration 
process. 
Presumably, voters across many districts stand to lose from 
the policy reversal. Why doesn't the political support re-form as the 
new members of the oversight committee reverse the original decisions? 
Besid·2.s the factors hindering the original formation, the existence 
of the agency fundamentally alters the status quo. A policy reversal 
which benefits the small opposing minority distributes costs in a 
different manner and among a different subset of the population than 
prior to the original agency formation. 
The ICC will serve as an illustration. Originally, the market 
failure arose from the local monopolies enjoyed by the railroads. 
This problem was solved by the ICC which outlawed short haul long haul 
rate differentials. As the problem was solved, support for regulation 
faded; nevertheless, the ICC remained. Over time, it became more 
effective as a cartel manager, raising rates on all previously compet-
itive routes but continuing the ban on local discrimination. The costs 
were distributed over consumers in all markets rather than concentrated 
among a small subset as before. 
In conclusion, the policy reversal does not imply that the 
movement will immediately re-form. Nevertheless, gains from public 
action remain and the issue may rise again. If public concern does 
grow,a second policy rever.sal may occur, bringing the public sec tor 
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through a full cycle back to the original policy. 
RESPONDING TO A MASS MOVEMENT 
The previous section explored the dynamics of a movement's 
formation and decline, and its influence on legislative outcomes 
of the second stage of policy formation. It assumed the creation of an 
agency in response to a mass movernent~ This section provides the missing 
link by discussing the creation of an agency by a legislature in 
response to the damands of a mass movement. 
A mass movement among the citizens of a political economy 
occurs whan a large portion of the voters of many districts support 
a particular policy position on one or more issues. The movement need 
not encompass a trans~district organization such as a party. It 
merely requires that a particular set of related ·policies be of concern 
in many districts and that commonly held opinions exist across districts. 
Examples of political movements are the Populists/Grange at the time 
of the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission; the Progressives 
at the time of the creation of the Food and Drug Administration and the 
Federal Trade Commission; and both the consumer and environmental 
movements of today (and their support of the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, the Agency for Consumer Advocacy, etc.). 
In terms of the electoral mechanism of the previous chapter, 
an issue, k, becomes an issue dimension in a district campaign when 
many citizens of the district adopt the opinion of the movement. Once 
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it has become part of district j's campaign, maximizing candidates will 
announce stands, 1. ok' on the issue. If the movement includes the 
~g 
median voter in this district (which, of course, necessitates including 
half or more of the district's voters), then candidates maximizing 
the probability of election will support the movement's position. 
A movement which gains the support of many median voters in 
various districts gains support for its position in the legislature. 
If the size of the support approaches a majority of the committee with 
jurisdiction ove r this issue, and a majority of the whole legislature, 
the movement's position becomes a serious contender for legislative 
policy formation. Whether the legislature will pass such a proposal 
depends upon how l a rge the movement becomes , hence how much support it 
gains in the legislature, as well as the distribution of representatives 
from supporting districts among the various committees. 
Several assumptions are needed to define the political nature 
of the movement which supports regulation in order to be specific about 
the legislative outcome for the case of regulation. The first 
assumption is informational in n a ture. The pos ition fav ored by the 
mass movement is assumed to be consistent with the economic rationale 
for regulation. Specifically, a particular market failure i s presumed 
to exist (natural monopoly, externality, informational inefficiency, 
etc.) with a movement of c onsumers supporting government intervention 
into the market to correct the market failure. 
This is a rationality assumption and rules out the possibility 
that the political system implements the demand of the movement, but 
that the movement through .ignorance, supports a nonsensical policy. 
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To assume that the political system misdirects the agency because 
consumers are uninformed verges on the tautological. Unless citizen 
misinformation is itself modeled so that an explicit correspondence 
is drawn between the misinformation of consumers and the position they 
support, this hypothesis cannot be proven ~rrongK While modeling 
consumer misinformation and the subsequent political pressure is 
a fruitful approach, it is not taken here. 3 
To define the political context of the regulatory issue, the 
first assumption requires consideration of the economic impact of 
regulation. Since an individual representative judges alternative 
policies on the basis of their effect on his district, the impact of 
regulation must be studied district by district. This allows inferences 
about the behavior of individual representatives to be made, and hence 
about the policy outcomes of the whole body. 
The following discussion develops the political context of 
regulation. The main example for the discussion is' consumer product 
safety regulation. 4 Though the model is slightly specialized to this 
case, it can be generalized to discuss other forms of economic regula-
tion. The scheme assumes that the distribution of firms and consumers 
is not uniform across all districts; some districts may predominantly 
contain consumers, other predominantly producer groups (of consumer 
products), while others may be mixed. 
Imposing mandatory safety standards requires firms to make 
products which invariably are more costly. This implies an increase 
in market price accompanied by a decrease in output. Unless subsidized, 
individuals associated with producers bear a net. loss since production 
56 
is restricted. In the short run, the firm's profits are lowered; in 
the long run it may go out of business. The negative impact of 
regulation extends beyond the particular firm to affect other actors in 
the district. The local economy also suffers. In general, decreases 
in production create local unemployment through a decrease in labor 
requirements. Local suppliers of the firm, and of the former employees 
(considered as consumers), suffer a loss in demand for their services, 
which has a similar negative impact. All of these actors are voters 
.in the district and will express preferences on this issue based upon 
its ~egative impact on their choices. 
In general, consumers of the product are better off, since 
5 they now purchase safer products. From the standpoint of the welfare 
analysis of market failure it does not matter that various types of 
economic actors locate in different geographic regions. However, 
because of the nature of the districting mechanism, the political system 
transforms such "irrelevant" considerations into critical factors. 
A representative must consider policy on the basis of the impact on 
his district; Paretian considerations aside, the relative concentration 
of producer/consumer groups does matter. In general, regulation imposes 
net costs on individuals within districts containing an abundance of 
producers. As a result of regulation (i.e., safer products), the 
change in producer behavior benefits consumers in other districts. 
In order to determine the decision of the representative from 
a given district, k, the costs and benefits from various actions must 
be weighed against one another. 
The following calculus is defined solely in terms of 
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·representative" k's own subjective beliefs concerning his district's 
response to action. 
Definition: Let b be the votes gained from £avoring regulation. ~ . 
Let c k be the votes lost from favoring regulation. 
And, let Bk=b
k 
- ck be the net vote change from favoring 
regulation. 
Imposing regulation divides the set of all districts, K, into 
three types, K
l
, K
2
, and K
3
. 
Type I: "Producing districts," Kl = {kEeK 1Bk < O} 
Individuals in these districts bear a disproportionate share 
of the costs of regulation, owing to the concentration of regulated 
producers; these costs are not outweighed by the benefits received by 
these citizens from the regulation of all other districts' products. 
Type II: "Consuming districts." K2 = {kEeK ==> B > 0 k 
These districts have no producers, and therefore individuals 
within it bear no direct costs of regulation while benefiting from the 
regulation of all other district's products. 
Type III: "Mixed districts." 
Mixed districts contain a few regulated producers, and hence 
some individuals bear direct costs from regulation. However, their 
number does not outweigh the number of individuals who benefit from 
all other districts' regulations. 
Without further assumption no inferences can be made 
about the relative size of each subset of districts -- or in fact 
whether all subsets are nonempty. All that is known; a priori 
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Having defined the costs and benefits of regulation for each 
representative, it is assumed that safety regulation becomes a national 
issue entering every electoral campaign. Further it is assumed that 
median vpters from producer districts are associated with the industry; 
hence regulation has a negative impact on them. Median voters in 
consuming and mixed districts are assumed to be consumers who are not 
associated with the regulated industries and therefore favor regulation. 
Consequently, representatives from producing districts will oppose 
regulation 'tv-hile those from consuming and mixed districts will support 
it; they will, respectively, attempt to defeat proposed legislation 
imposing regulation, or to fight for its passage. This conflict will 
be resolved according to the rules of the legislation. 
Each representative, judging the proposal in terms of its 
impact on his district, weighs it against the status quo. Regulation 
yields the following payoff vector to the various representatives: 
(BI , B2 . • • Bn ), vs. the status quo·: (0,0, ...• 0). The preferences 
of the ith legislator for or against the proposal depends upon whether 
or not Bi > 0 (i.e., whether iEK2 U K3). At the initial stage of policy 
formation by the legislature, rules RI and R2 constrain legislative 
activity. The first requires that a majority of members of the commit-
tee with jurisdiction over the regulatory issue favor regulation. This 
condition must be satisfied before the whole body can vote on the mea-
sure. The second rule then requires that a majority of all legislators 
favor the proposal in order to enact the legislation. 
More precisely, the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
enacting legislation are ·as follows. Let C be the subset of legislators 
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on the oversight committee e.C C K). 
(i) A majority of the committee must favor passage: 
(ii) A majority of all legislators must favor passage: 
If these necessary conditions are not satisfied, then the regulatory 
proposa l will fail. Thus , a policy to correc t a market failure may 
not pass simply b ecause the distribution of benefits is too concentrated 
relative to the costs. If they are satisfied, however,6 then the 
committee will propose regulation, and a maj ority of leg islators will 
vote for the proposal. 
The above scheme cannot predict when a regulatory proposal 
will pass the l egislature without knowing, or postula ting , the distri-
bution of representatives from the various types of districts (KI , K2 
and K3 ) on the committee with jurisdiction over regulation, and the 
total number of each type in the legislature. In the absence of this 
knowledge , the fate of a proposal cannot b e known. A small minority 
of legislators who oppose regulation, for example, may block the 
legislation if they compose a majority of the appropriate committee. 
However, regulatory agency capture presumes the creation of 
an agency, so the necessary conditions can be presumed to hold. Given 
that an agency has been created, the necessary conditions yield infor-
mation about the preferences of the members of the policy oversight 
committee who will control agency policy implementation. At the time 
of passage, the necessary conditions imply that committee members 
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favoring regulation dominate agency policy making. This condition 
is central to the discussion of agency capture in the next chapter. 
It allows inferences to b e made about the initial regulatory policy 
choice and will form the background against which the changes in the 
political environment can be discussed. 
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2. See, f or example, the pathb reaking works of Mancur Ols on, The 
Logic of Collective Ac tion (Cambridge : Harvard Univers ity Press, 
1965); and Lance E . Davis and Doug l ass C. North, Inst itutional 
Change and American Economic Grmvth (Cambridge: . Cambridge 
Unive r sity Press, 1971). 
3 . However, see Melvin J. Hinich, " A Social Choice Mode l fo r Consume r 
Support for Food Regulation, " mimeographed (Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute, 1975). Studying FDA food regula tion, he shows how 
the sys t ematic lack of consumer info rmat ion, itself the rationale 
for r egula t i on, translates through the political process into 
pressure on the agency to regulate the wrong category o f hazards. 
For an .intuitive exposition, see Mark Nadel, The Politics of 
Cons ume r Protection (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 1971), ch. 3. 
4. Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion of the informational 
inefficiency embodied in the product safe ty problem a nd t he 
policy p r escriptions t o cope with it . 
5. Consumers do bear some portion of the costs' of regulation through 
the r ise in market price . Standard inc idence theory can be used 
t o study the distribution of the costs b e t ween produce rs and 
consumers . However, as i n the case of imposing a tax on consumer 
products , on l y in a special- case will consumers bear the full 
costs of r egulation. 
6. Strategic considerations are ignored in this formula t ion. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE POLITICAL CYCLES OF AGENCY POLICY MAKING 
Following its creation by the legislature, the agency 
implements its mandate by making policy decisions. This begins the 
political cycle of agency policy making. The agency's actions reflect 
the preferences expressed by the current members of the oversight 
committee. Legislators who supported the regulation to redress a 
market failure, and produced an agency, ensure it benefits their 
constituents . 
This chapter builds on the previous chapter by exploring 
the changes in committee policy choice which reflect the changes 
within the political environment of regulation . The first part of 
the cycle of agency policy follows the decline in public support for 
regulation; the second part reflects a renaissance of public support. 
In both cases, the model in Chapter 4 describes the alterations in 
policy which occur in response to these changes~ 
A decline in the political support for regulation affects a 
representative ' s preferences over policy by changing the electoral 
rewards for various actions on the issue . The decline implies that 
representatives ' of producing districts remain the only ones who benefit 
from altering outcomes on this issue. As only these representatives 
seek to influence outcomes, they begin to dominate committee policy. 
The process works in reverse in the second case: as support for 
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regulation increases, the committee make-up is altered from one 
concerned with producers to one partially or wholly sympathetic 
to consumers. 
Changes in agency policy reflect the change in preferences 
expressed by members of the committee (in part through membership 
change and in part through changes in induced preferences of the 
remaining members). The committee continues to use agency policy 
to benefit its constituents. However, the change in committee members 
preferences alters the distribution of policy benefits among the 
subsets of constituents. 
Creating an agency fundamentally alters the institutional 
rules by which legislators influence agency policy. In the initial 
stage of policy formation, the decisions of the committee are subject 
to majority · rule approval by the whole body (R2). The politics of this 
stage were explored in Chapter 5. This chapter discusses how agency 
policy responds to change in the political environment subsequent to 
the agency's enactment. At this time~ responsibility for oversight and 
control is delegated to the committee, which no longer requires majority 
rule approval of the entire legislature prior to action (R3). R3 
affords the oversight committee controlling agency policy a greater 
degree of freedom in the· policy implementation stage than in the 
previous stage of policy formation. This implies that policy decisions 
made by .agencies are more responsive to changes in political support 
than is the creation or dismantling of whole agencies. 
The political cycle of agency policy begins as the agency 
starts making policy decisions following its legislative direction. 
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Members of the oversight committee will use their control over agency 
policy to suit their own electoral needs, namely, securing policies 
beneficial to their constituents. As implied by the necessary conditions 
of Chapter 5, the presumption that an agency has been created requires 
that a majority of the committee (,,,hich eVidently controls policy 
decisions on that issue) favors regulation. The majority, which pro-
duced an agency to benefit consumers in the first stage of policy 
choice, will now ensure that the agency implements policies which are 
beneficial to this group. 
The mass movement gains an agency to benefit its members 
while it has its greatest support. This situation is unstable (as 
argued in the preceding chapter). Several factors intervene which 
most likely result in a decline in the movement's support. 
Consider, now, the response of the policy making process 
to the waning of the movement. As the movement fades regulation slowly 
ceases to be an electoral issue which reduces its (electorally generated) 
support within the legislature. The median voter from a district which 
previously supported regulation may no longer be concerned '''ith the 
problem. Representatives form these districts no longer gain elector-
ally from control over agency policy and begin to pursue other legis-
lative matters which have a greater marginal impact on their district. 
Committee decisions change as this process occurs for the members of 
the oversight committee who previously controlled agency policy. 
In terms of the model in Chapter 4, the relative saliency 
of the issues in a given district now change, so that is, the marginal. 
impact of the various issues on the utility of the median voter changes. 
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At one time, the movement commanded majority support on the appropriate 
policy committee. The issue becomes less prominent as the agency begins 
implementing policies consistent with its mandate, and voters begin to 
focus on other policy areas. Representatives respond by altering the 
focus of their policy-influencing activities away from the formerly 
popular issue . 
A decline in the political strength of the regulated actors 
(who opposed the introduction of regulation) is unlikely. While the mass-
movement was formed specifically to ra~se this issue, industrial groups 
often existed before the issue arose. Trade associations, for instance, 
may have been created for a variety of reasons, none of which were to 
influence regulatory policy. Further, in many cases, regulated actors 
must interact with the agency on a continual basis . At the extreme, 
every major .decision requires agency approval. Finally, unlike con-
sumers, producers do not face the free rider problem. Since regulatory 
decisions are made case by case, the firm can privatize the benefits 
of its own efforts in the regulatory arena. 
For these reasons, producers remain aware of the relationship 
between agency decisions and their own viability. Representatives from 
producer districts continue to have an incentive to intervene on behalf 
of their constituents since this results in electoral payoffs, this is 
no longer the case for representatives of consuming districts. l 
In sum, as the movement fades, a fundamental asymmetry appears 
between consumers and producers . Representatives from consuming dis-
tricts no longer gain electorally from pursuing regulatory matters. 
Representatives from producing districts remain in a position to receive 
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electoral support from policy intervention. Representatives from 
mixed districts continue to gain electorally from regulatory inter-
vention, but the intervention is now on behalf of the district 1 s 
producers rather than consumers. 
In response to evolving issues, preferences expressed by 
representatives have changed. The make-up of the preferences expressed 
by members of the committee changes for several re~sonsK First, new 
members may join the committee. A decline in the movement alters the 
relative incentives for a given representative to join the various 
committees, by changing the relative saliency of the issues. Because 
of the asymmetry between producers and consumers, representatives from 
producing districts now have a differential incentive to join the 
committee. Only their constituents generate political rewards on the 
issue. 
Second, the ·preferences of members who remain on the committee 
may change. Members from Type I (producing) districts still favor 
change in regulatory policy to benefit their constituents. Representa-
tives from Type II (consuming) districts no longer have an incentive to 
ensure policies benefit consumers~ Finally) representatives from Type 
III districts no longer respond to their consuming subconstituency 
and favor policies beneficial to their producing constituents. 
Another factor affecting outcomes reflects changes in prefer-
ences expressed by noncommittee memhers. Other members are potential 
traders with members for policy intervention to aid their constituents. 
As the composition of nonmember preferences changes, the nature of 
policy intervention on behalf of their constituents will change as well. 
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In particular, a decline in political support for regulation means 
that only representatives of producers will be interested in trading 
with committee members. 
Thus, any preferences expressed on this issue will be against 
the agency pursuing its mandate. Representatives from producing 
districts are now in a position to control agency policy. To see this, 
as well as which policy will be pursued, consider the strategies 
available to member k of the oversight committee. There are two cases, 
corresponding to whether member k represents producers (i.e., kEKl or K3 ) 
or whether he represents a consuming district (kEK
2
). 
Case I CkEKl' or K3 ). The available strategies are:
2 
a l : He can ensure that the agency implements its mandate. This 
yields him -c
k 
< O. 
b l : He can intervene on behalf of his regulated constituents to 
reduce the severity of the decisions ",hich concern them, 
perhaps even securing beneficial decisions. This yields 
* * his district -c
k 
>-ckC-c
k 
may be >0). 
c l : In addition to intervening on behalf of his own regulated 
constituents, he can make trades with other legislators, i, 
to reduce the severity of regulations concerning their 
constituents. In return k receives the benefits of 
legislation from i's committee qki> O. Thus, i's payoff 
* * increases fFon -c i to -c i ' and receives -ck + qkio 
d
1
: Finally, he can abolish the agency, causing his net gain 
to equal zero. 
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a
2
: He can ensure that the agency implements its mandate. Since 
regulation is no longer an electoral issue, this yields zero. 
b
Z
: He can intervene on behalf of his consuming constituency. 
The electoral rewards from this action are again zero. 
c
2
: He can make trades with other legislators, i, to intervene 
on behalf of i' s regulated constituents. In return, k, 
receives the benefits of i's committee, qki' This yields 
k qki > O. 
d Z : Finally, he can abolish the agency. The electoral rewards 
from the action are zero. 
Representatives from producing districts (and from mixed 
districts) will choose strategy (c l ) or Cdl ), depending upon 
* > whether -ck " + qki < O. As long as representative k can interven e in 
the regulatory proceeding to gain decisions which yield net benef it 
to his regulated constituents (e.g., if the agency becomes a cartel 
* manager, then possibly -ck > 0), strategy (c l ) will dominate all 
others. Ironically, Case II shows that representatives from consuming 
districts can only gain from decisions which benefit producer groups . 
Electoral rewards are no longer generated on the issue for these 
representatives since the movement's support within the district has 
faded. They may gain through trading a policy change which favors 
producers in return for the benefits of another committee's legislation, 
qki (strategy (c Z) dominates). One other factor further facilitates this 
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regulatory problem for a time. Voters turn their attention to 
other "unsolved" issues. Third, exogenous factors have an influence 
as well. The dynamics of large group formation are not well understood. 
Some periods facilitate their formation while others do not, so their 
formation remains unpredictable to some extent. Examples are the 
intercession of World War I on the Progressive Movement, or the Great 
Depression's influence on the reforms of the 1930s. 3 
This completes the description of the first stage of agency 
policy making in the political cycles model: in respons e to the waxing 
and waning of mass-based support for regulation, the policy pursued 
by the agency varies. In the initial period of policy oversight, 
.because the movement remains a significant political factor with the 
ability to reward or punish legislators, the agency implements policies 
consistent with its mandate. As the movement wanes, the distribution 
of preferences among legislators on the oversight committee changes. 
As the producer groups become the only political factor, their repre-
sentatives dominate the co~ittee policy making process on this issue. 
Since the relevant institutional rule of the legislature at this stage 
requires only a majority of the committee to approve a policy change 
(R3), agency policy will benefit the regulated producers. 
Potential gains remain to various subsets of consumers whose 
welfare is affected by agency policy making. If regulation becomes 
an issue once again, and receives support from many districts (which 
once .again advocate policies to redress a market failure), agency 
policy may alter a .second time in an attempt to benefit those voters 
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who now respond to the issue. The process works much the same as in 
the policy change in the first step of the cycle; legislators' policy 
stands and legislative activities respond to changes in the preferences 
expressed by their constituents. 
The existence ,cf "benefits from collective action is not a 
sufficient condition fo.r such action since the prisoner's dilemma 
imposed by the district mechanism remains. The factors which allow 
movements to form remain exogenous to some extent. Some agencies may 
never experience a revival in their policy area as a campaign issue or 
may go unnoticed for extended periods, while others may face recurrent 
public concern. Agencies in the former group may never complete the 
full cycle in their policies. Those among the latter group are more 
likely to complete it. 
In the second part of the policy cycle, representatives of 
most producing districts will continue to receive electoral response 
from their constituents. However, other representatives will experience 
a change in the response to their action. Regulation was no longer 
an issue in the middle of the cycle. Regulatory policy benefited 
producers, and representatives of consumer districts received no 
electoral benefit from actions to implement the mandate. As consumers 
once .again advocate regulation, new preferences for representatives are 
induced according to the Downsian electoral mechanism. Representatives 
from districts which support regulation will favor implementation of the 
agency's mandate. 
Agency policy decisions may change after a lag period. The 
same three factors which led to the policy change in the first part 
71 
of the cycle still prevail. First, relative incentives to join the 
committee change; second, preferences expressed by remaining committee 
members may change; and finally, the incentives of noncommittee members 
to make trades with committee members for intervention activities also 
change. If the new movement gains enough support on the oversight 
committee, agency policy decisions will be altered. 
This completes the full political cycle of agency policy 
making. Regulatory benefits, as part of the political system, respond 
to change in the environment of the policy issue. Agency policy may 
change as the make-up of the collection of constituents seeking to 
influence r.egulatory decisions changes. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1. On the role of intervention activities of legislators, see 
Morris P. Fiorina, "The Case of the Vanishing Marginals: The 
Bureaucracy Did It,". American Political Science Review 71 
(1976):177-181; idem, Congress: Keystone of the Hashington 
Estab lishment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); and 
Roger G. Noll and Morris P. Fiorina , "Voters, Legislators , 
and Bureaucrats: A Rational Choice Interpre tation of the 
Growth of Bureaucracy," mimeographed (Stanford University, 
1976). Its relation to regulation is noted in David Mayhew, 
Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale 
Univers ity Press, 1974) . 
2. Recall that the benefits and cos t s (i.e., ck, bk , and Bk) are 
the electoral payoffs to representative k and not the welfare 
gains and losses to h is district. 
3. The first and third 
Douglass C. North, 
. Gr2wth (Cambridge: 
factors a r e discussed in Lance E. Davis and 
Institutional Change and American Economic 
Cambridge University Press, 1971) . 
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PART III 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF FIVE REGULATORY ARENAS 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETARY PROCESS: 
REGULATORY AGENCY POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR 
This chapter investigates Congressional response to organized 
groups as well as the unorganized, diffuse groups in an attempt to 
distinguish between the three capture hypotheses. By studying the 
actual mechanism by which Congress controls agency policy, the response 
of the policy making process to the .various groups can be observed. 
A major Congressional control mechanism is the budgetary process . As 
is the case for all agencies in the Federal gove rnment, each regulatory 
commission must face the Congress each year to receive its annual 
appropriation, or allotment of funds . At this time, the agency's past 
performance and its requests for policy changes are scrutinized. 
Program levels are controlled by Congressional appropriations . 
If an agency has not spent money as Congress desires, the appropriations 
committee may use its many sanction and control mechanisms to ensure 
1 . I camp lance. ~~ong the tools available for this purpose are earmarking 
funds for specific projects, activities, or purposes; failing to 
allocate any funds for specific categories; placing ceilings on 
the number of employees of an agency or altering their distribution 
among the various activities of the agency; and fostering or hindering 
the agency's (or its administrators') new policy initiatives or pet 
projects. 
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Given some assumptions about the nature of the judicial 
system's influence on policy choice, the Congressional response to 
diffuse movements can be assessed through the budgetary process. 
The argument proceeds as follows. The ·judicial system 
is shown to give the advantage to the organized groups through the 
evidenciary and due process requirements imposed by the Supreme Court 
and by the Congress. The main point is that an agency cannot make 
a policy decision for which ther e is no evidence. Organized partici-
pants present evidence supporting their position while unorganized 
groups do not. Therefore, if political actors want to benefit 
unorganized groups, they must allocate greater resources to the agency 
so that it can substantiate a position not presented by an organized 
group, . 
Congress has an important control variable here which makes 
.agency policy making more or les s responsive to organized groups. The 
variable is the agency's capacity for research and analysis which can 
often be observed directly in the budget. To the degree that Congress 
wants an agency to be dependent upon the organized groups, it will 
allocate fewer resources J'or .this purpose. Finally, Congressional 
behavior in this category will be observed to distinguish between the 
capture models. 
The conclusions are tentative; however, in some instances, 
the budgetary histories presented in the following chapters indicate 
Congressional response to diffuse, relatively unorganized groups. 
This suggests the political system is more than a vehicle by which 
the most organized group on a given issue dictates policy. The 
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pattern observed in several agencies is best understood by the model 
presented earlier in Part II, and cannot be explained by the cartel-by-
design or the life cycle theses. 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY POLICY 
This section explores the relationship between agency policy 
making and the influence of the organized groups. It argues that the 
evidence on the judicial systems influence on policy outcomes compli-
ments the conceptualization of the political process as a mechanism for 
aggregating the interests of-various groups. 
Two features of the legal system account for its effects on 
policy outcomes. 2 The first is the nature of its evidenciary require-
ments; the second is its requirement of due process. 
The current evidenciary requirement for regulatory agencies 
stems from the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (APA). This act, 
however, merely rationalized de facto requirements imposed by the courts 
over the previous fifty years. In 1912, the Supreme Court ruled that 
"it has been settled that the orders of the commission are final unless 
(1) beyond the power which it CQuld constitutionally exercise; or (2) 
beyond its statutory power; or (3) based upon a mistake of law.,,3 
Further, concerning mixeo questions of law and fact, the court confined 
itself to the ultimate question .as to whether the commission acted 
within its power. In the next two years this was defined to mean 
whether there was "substantial evidence to support the order.,,4 
The substantial evidence requirement is a weak evidenciary 
rule~ In fact, a full range of evid·enciary requirements are employed 
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in various categories of court proceedings. Criminal proceedings 
require the strongest rule. Findings must be proven to be true 
beyond all reasonable doubt. Civil law employes a less stringent rule. 
Decisions must be supported by a preponderance (or the bulk) of 
evidence. The requirement of administrative law is still weaker. 
The substantial evidence rule merely requires that a reasonable man 
be capable of supporting the ruling,5 
In terms of the regulatory proceeding, the requirement of 
substantial evidence means -that an agency t s ruling may_ stand in court 
even if a preponderance of evidence can be established against the 
ruling. For example, consider an agency ruling on a regulated firm's 
request to raise its rates. As long as the firm has properly documented 
its own case, a substantial amount of evidence exists to support a 
ruling favorable to the firm. Such a ruling may not be overturned 
in court on the basis of substance, even if there exist more persuasive 
arguments (e . g., a preponderance of evidence) against the case. 
The substantial evidence rule was strongly contested in the 
debates preceding the passage of the APA. 6 Nonetheless, Congress 
unanimously favored the weaker requirement. The weaker rule gives 
politicians greater freedom of choice over alternative policies to the 
degree that agency policy making is controlled by the political process. 
Political actors value their increased discretion because the politi-
cally expedient policy choice may not coincide with the policy supported 
by the bulk of the evidence. 
·The due process requirements also influence the nature of 
agency decision making. 7 The requirement stems from the Fifth and 
78 
Four teenth Amendments which require that agency decisions be neither 
arbitrary nor capricious. The judicial system has interpreted this to 
mean that an agency's decision be supported by substantial evidence 
and that it be based on all the information and evidence submitted. 
Should the agency fail to consider any piece of evidence , grounds 
for overturning the ruling exist and the a gency may be forced to 
begin anew. 
Judicial review of agency decisions on procedural grounds 
gives the advantage to organized interests for two reasons. First, 
these groups are more l ikely to challenge a ruling in court . Establish-
ing that a ruling is based on all the evidence requires that 'In agency 
devote scarce resources to reviewing its findings to make certain that 
all points raised by all parties are duly considered. Being challenged 
in court on precedural (rather than substantive) ground risks having 
a ruling overturned. The commitment of further resources to restudy 
the same problem which follows a reversal by the courts means the 
agency is more likely to p ay attention to the interests of those groups 
which are likely to challenge its decisions. 
Second, and more importantly, organized groups tend to 
document their position while unorganized, nonparticipants do n ot. 
Since this documentation provides the basis for substantial evidence 
supporting a decision in favor of a group's position, it introduces 
an asymmetry in the proceedings . If an agency decides in favor of 
a represented group, it may often use the submitted evidence as 
justification for its decision. However, in order for the agency to 
implement new policy initiatives or policies which are closer to the 
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interests of unrepresented groups the age ncy itself mus t develop 
indepe ndent evidence and analysis. Without this effort , the basis 
for substantial evidence supporting these policies will not be 
established (and will not survive a court challenge). This asymmetry 
creates the bias in favor" o f the organized groups since the promulgation 
of poiicies favoring unorganized g r oups necessarily r equire greater 
resources. 
A crucial control variable which enables Congress to affect 
agency policy i s the amount to resources which go to a n agency for 
its own research and analysis. An agency's ability to develop its own 
information, interpretation of the facts, and policy choice which will 
hold up in court, depends upon the amount of research and analysis it 
can conduct. I f a n agency's independent c apacity is limited, the nature 
of the judicial r eview constrains its policy choice to be in the set of 
alternatives presented by the repre sented interests. Congress will 
allocate fewer analytical resources to the age ncy to the d egree that it 
wants an agency to depend on the o r ganized group~ K 
Of course, increasing the ind ependence of an agency from 
organized interests does not ensure that it will consider the inte rests 
of the unorganized groups. Congress must use other means of influencing 
agency decis ions to ensure this policy outcome. 8 
Both the economic and political science literatures cite 
many instances of Congressional intervention to alter the course of 
agency policy making. A full range of tools are available for this 
purpose. For example, Congress may specify particular provisions in 
an agency's authorizing legislation such as unrealistic procedural 
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deadline which limit the scope of possible regulations in various 
ways. 9 It may hold hearings on an issue pending before a regulatory 
commission. In one instance, the courts threw out a decision by the 
FTC on the grounds that the Congressional pressure via the hearings 
may have influenced the agency's decisions.1q Congress may also 
amend the act which an agency oversees, forcing it to change its 
policy choice. In some cases, passing a resolution may have the same 
effect. Coase cites an example of this type in which Congress stopped 
the Federal Communications Commission from implementing its plans to 
begin the auctioning of the station licenses.ll The previous method 
for allocation of licenses had become a rubber-stamp renewal process 
which benefited current owners. Though this and other means of 
statutory intervention have been studied in detail, no one has 
systematically investigated budgeting asa policy device. 
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS AND EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF CONGRESSIONAL 
INFLUENCE 
The literature on the budgetary process supports the concep-
tualization of the political system as an interest group aggregation 
mechanism. 12 A major conclusion about the appropriations process 
relates agencies to their constituencies: those which develop indentifi-
able, supportive constituencies .fare better than those which do not. 
According to one student of budgeting, an agency's budgetary success 
hinges more upon whether the agency acts as a good politician than on 
elaborate technical support and evidence for the its requests. And, 
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Being a good politician. . • requires essentially three 
things: cultivate an active clientele, the development 
of confidence among other governmental officials, and 
skill in following strategies that exploit one's 
opportunities to the maximum. Doing good work is 
viewed as part of being a good politician. 13 
In particular, Wildavsky' stresses that an agency must "serve your 
clientele," "expand your clientele," "secure [Congressional and 
clientele1 feedback," and "concentrate on individual constituencies" 
(i.e., be specific about which groups benefit from particular programs 
or potential changes in policies). 
Weidenbaum's study14 supports this view. By disaggre-
gating the broad budgetary categories (such as Defense or Health, 
Education and Welfare), he shows that the bulk of the budget goes to 
specific, identifiable groups and not the general public. Although 
these groups vary in their degree of organization, all can be identified 
as a specific subset of the population. 
Another conclusion of this literature is that budgeting 
is incremental. Congress tends to establish a base budget for each 
agency which defines the level of the various services and activities 
performed by the agency. In general, an agency's budget is adjusted 
incrementally; significant deviations from the established base are 
closely scrutinized and difficult to obtain. 15 
The significance of the base budget for policy influence is 
that programs are harder to change once the base has been established. 
The major influence on policy formation occurs during the formation 
of the base. Therefore, the period just following the agency's creation 
must be investigated to assess Congressional influence on an agency_ 
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This can be observed by following the adjustments made by Congress 
in the various agency program levels. The same applies to agencies 
which have undergone reorganization by Congress: the adjustment 
made following reorganization must be compared to those prior to 
the change. 
How does Congress actually influence an agency's choices so 
that the major portion of the decision favors the specific groups it 
wa nts to benefit 16 A distinction made in the literature for this purpose 
is between across-the- board budge t cuts and categorical or programmatic 
cuts. An agency's budget reques t normally breaks down its operations 
into a number of categories or programs . Each category represents 
a particular function performed by the agency such as enforcement 
activities standard setting, or research. Across-the-board cuts are 
a set percentage decrease in each category. This technique is used to 
affect the scale of an agency's operation and often reflects fiscal 
concerns not directly associated with the agency ' s operation (e.g., full 
employment policies). Categorical cuts, or the redistribution of an 
agency's resources among its various programs are used to influence 
agency policy. By restricting the use of funds for some purposes and 
expanding their availability for others. Congress can influence an 
agency's decisions in many ways. 
Consider the sample budget in Table 7-1 in which the agency's 
operation is divided into five programs. Standards setting is the 
process by which the agency promulgates regulations. This encompasses 
the formal r e gulatory apparatus (such as licensing boards, hearing 
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examiners, or standard setting proceduresF~ Regulatory research is 
defined as the agency's in-house research activities which may be inputs 
for the commission's decisions or for alternative views on reg ulations 
than those submitted by the various participants. This category 
represents the agency t s c'apacity for independent analysis of its 
regulatory problems. Training activities include training the field 
inspectors who must learn the regulations and how to test for their 
effectiveness. Enforcement activities form the incentive arm of the 
commission, through inspections of the regulated actors to see if the 
rules are being followed. Administration funds cover costs for the 
commissioners and their staffs to support major policy decisions. 
Administration also includes all administrative and management functions 
for oversight and direction of its own operation. 
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
TABLE 7-1: SAMPLE AGENCY BUDGET 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Standards Setting $ 3.6 
Regulatory Research 2.7 
Training 3.0 
Enforcement 27.6 
Administration 2.3 
Total 39.2 
Congress influences the agency's operation by adjusting 
the relative distribution of resources among the various categories. 
For example, consider enforcement activities. For an agency to be 
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effective, regulated actors must have an incentive to follow the 
regulations. An agency's enforcement activities are a major component 
of the incentive system. By increasing the frequency of inspections, 
the agency increases the expected costs of being found in violation. 
The greater the resources for this purpose, the more likely that 
17 
the regulated actors will follow the regulations. 
As a second example of influence, Congress may allocate a 
large amount for enforcement activities to support a huge inspection 
pr.ogram. However, if the number of regulations is large, allocating few 
resources for training means that only the simplest and trivial regula-
tions can be enforced. By adjusting these two variables, Congress has 
a wide degree of latitude in its influence on the agency's effectiveness 
in enforcing its decisions. 
To "make inferences about Congressional influence on agency 
policies, the pattern of Congressional appropriations must be observed 
category by category. The key variables to compare are the relative rates 
of change in the resources going to each program or category. Relative 
rates of change are the appropriate basis for comparisons since Congress 
adjusts budgets over a series of years rather than in a given year. This 
indicates how the resources of the agency are being redistributed, and 
hence which programs Congress wants to strengthen, and which it wants 
to diminish. 
As argued in the previous section, the category of analytical 
capabilities plays a pivotal role in the agency's dependence on (or 
favorability towards) the organized interests. The eVidenciary and due 
process requirements of the judicial system force the agency to focus 
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attention on the organized interests. In order· to develop and pursue 
policies which are not merely a compromise between the views of the 
organized participants, an agency needs resources for its own analysis. 
Otherwise it will fail to estahlish substantial evidence to support 
a ruling which is not favorable to a represented group. 
Given the nature of the judicial system , the three approaches 
to the political process make different predictions about the use of 
this control variable. In principle, then, they can be distinguished 
by observing actual budgetary patterns. The cartel-by-design thesis 
conceptualizes policy making as responsive solely to organized interests. 
It predicts that Congress will al.locate few resources for analysis and 
standards development relative to .other categories such as administra~ 
tion and enforcement . During periods of agency expansion (i.e., when 
the agency's · total appropriations are increasing) this category will 
expand at a slower rate than the others. 
The life cycle hypothesis predicts an initial response to 
unorganized groups followed hy a decay period in which the organized 
groups continually gain influence. In terms of the budgetary process, 
this means Congress should provide adequate funds for anal ysis fo llowed 
by a constant decline in resources (as the agency begins to benefit 
organized groups). 
The model presented in part II makes the opposite prediction: 
if the political system responds to the interests of relativ~ly 
unorganized groups, an agency's analytical capabilities will receive 
more favorable treatment by Congress. During periods of agency growth, 
this means that analysis will grow at a greater rate than most other 
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. categories. Since the political cycles view allows all participating 
groups some influence over policy choice, the degree to which analysis 
fares more favorable than the other categories depends upon the 
relative degree of strength of the opposing groups. The weaker the 
organized opposition, the more likely this category will grow 
significantly faster than the others. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF AGENCY PERFORMANCE 
'The agencies chosen for the investigation are the Consumer. 
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Atomic Energy Commission/Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (AEC/NRC). All are either new entrants to the 
regulatory arena (CPSC, OSHA, and AEC/NRC) or have recently undergone 
a period of controversy and revitalization (FDA and FTC). 
This collection of agencies is a different type than those 
which have been of concern in the previous economic literature, on 
agency capture. \fuile the literature focuses on the so called "economic" 
regulation (regulation of monopoly and competition) by the older 
regulatory agencies such as the ICC, CAB, FPC, etc., the newer regula-
tory agencies tend to be mandated with noneconomic regulatory tasks. 
CPSC, OSHA, and FDA regulate aspects of safety and health exclusively; 
the FTC and the AEC/NRC do so to some extent as well. 
One major factor underlies the choice of newly-created 
or revitalized agencies (which introduces the distiction between the 
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agencies studies here and those of prime concern in the literature). 
The appropriation literature shows that budgeting is incremental. 
The critical period of Congressional influence occurs in the establish-
ment of the base budget following the agency's creation or revitaliza-
tion. Since budgetary reporting after the Second World War is vastly 
superior to the reporting in the previous era, investigation of 
Congressional influence as described above is actually possible. Prior 
to this time, the data are inadequate for this purpose. 
Each agency and its budgetary history are consid er ed separately 
in the following chapters to investigate the intent of Congress with 
respect to the dependence of agencies on various unorganized and organ-
ized groups. Observations about the agency's behavior are made. First, 
the stylized facts concerning the agency's performance are presented. 
The issues discussed are the degree of independence of the agency from 
organized groups, the identity of the beneficiaries from the agency's 
policies, and what evidence exists to support these contentions. Where 
possible, corroborative evidence is used to support the stylized facts. 
Second, the predictions of each capture hypothesis are 
discussed in the specific context of each agency's policy area. Each 
hypothesis predicts a unique pattern of agency resource allocation. 
Finally, the agency's appropriation history of each is observed to 
determine which model is most consistent with the data, and whether 
the pattern matches the stylized facts. 18 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY Cl~1fppflk 
The Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) of 1973 mandates the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to identify hazardous consumer 
products and to take action which it deems appropriate. In general 
this will lead to the promulgation of mandatory product standards. 
Two conflicting uses can be made of this process. Potential benefits 
to consumers arise from safer products due to the informational 
inefficiency inherent in the product safety problem. l In contrast, 
producers stand to gain if the mandatory standards impose anti-
competitive design specifications. CPSC policy determines the balance 
of benefits between these two uses of the process. This chapter 
explores the Commission's operation indicating the distribution of 
benefits between these two groups. 
CPSC operates in a political environment in which both sides 
of the market~ producers and consumers, are active. Both groups 
influenced the final form of the CPSA and the details of the Commission's 
2 
mandate. The potential for equal or nearly equal participation by 
consumer groups along with producers poses an initial problem for the 
cartel-by-design view. Which should be considered the major interest 
group to derive the benefits from agency policy? 
Since its inception in 1973, CPSC has been criticized for lack 
of progress in fulfilling its mandate. 3 In four years, it has 
promulgated only two standards under the CPSA, one for swimming pool 
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slides and the second for architectural glazing materials. The slow 
pace in standards production means the Commission yields few b enefits 
for any group; it is still too early to determine the actual distri-
bution of benefits by observing outcomes. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to observe CPSC response to various groups in initiation of action, 
even if few actions have completed the full cycle of standards produc-
tion. Response to the various groups indicates the probable distribu-
tion of benefits. 
This chapter argues that Congress designed CPSC to be responsive 
to both sets of organized groups in the environment. To the degree 
that both consumer and producer groups participate in agency policy 
making , both will benefit. However , if consumer participation de-
clines, the natur e of the Commission's> structure (of the regulatory 
process) combined · with Congressional influence through the budgetary 
process will force CPSC policy to benefit producers. The argument is 
based upon the structure of the Commission's standard development 
process and upon the nature of the safety proble~K 
The first section of this chapter summarizes the predictions 
made by the capture hypotheses. Each concerns the pattern of benefits 
resulting from agency policy making and Congressional budgetary behavior. 
The following section describes the CommissionD~ regulatory proces s in 
detail. In particular, the discussion focuses on the cumbersome 
regulatory apparatus whic h Congress designed for the Commission in the 
CPSA. This limits CPSC's influence on its o.m policy making in several 
important respects. The interaction of the budgetary process wi th 
these effects is then studied. Finally, the evidence regarding CPSC's 
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responSe to consumer and producer groups is analyzed. The last 
section investigates Congressional appropriations behavior. The 
endeavor reveals budgetary influenc e consistent with the observations 
in the previous section. Since this argues the influenc e of both 
groups, the political cycles view of the regulatory process is 
supported. 
PREDICTIONS OF EACH CAPTURE HYPOTHESIS 
The cartel-by-design thesis conceptua lizes the policy .making 
process as responsive to the most organized group on a given issue . 
It predicm tha t despite the degree of organization exhibited by 
consumers, producers dominate agency policy making on this issue. In 
the arena of product safety, producers use the standards development 
process to encompass anti-competitive actions; the next section 
explores this possibility more thoroughly. 
Within the context of the budgetary process, the cartel-by-
design thesis predicts that the Commission will continually fare unfavor-
ably in the category of analysis. As argued in the previous chapter, this 
forces the .agency to rely on the organized groups. . Since consumers 
are organized as well, their participation in the regulatory process 
will yield benefits unless Congress intervenes on behalf of their 
regulated cons tituents. If producers are to be the sole beneficia ries, 
Congress must intervene in agency proceedings against consumers, to the 
degree that the latter group chooses to participate . 
The life cycle thesis has no trouble with the relative degree 
of organization by consumers. It predicts that the Commission will 
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primarily benefit consumers in its initial years of operation. However, 
this orientation changes over time as the Commission begins to favor 
the interests of producers. 
The previous chapter argued that the agency needs 
resources for its own analysi? in order to make decisions beneficial 
to consumers. The degree of organization exhibited by consumers 
only partially mitigates the need for resources; they are not 
sufficiently organized to fully support the standard development 
process themselves. In order to force the agency to accept opinions 
and interpretations of the industry groups, Congress should stop 
allocating resources for this category~ 
Finally, the political cycles model predicts that all groups 
in the political environment will receive benefits; agency policy 
changes only if the groups which participate change. In the current 
context of both consumer and producer participation, it predicts that 
both benefit. Neither group should be observed dominating the agency 
or receiving all the benefits from agency policy making. 
In terms of the budgetary process, this hypothesis predicts 
that Congress will allocate few resources for the agency's inde.pendent 
capacity, forcing it to rely on the interpretations of both groups. 
Congress need not intervene. 
SAFETY REGULATION BY THE CPSC 
This section describes CPSC policy making in the first 
four years of its history (1973-1977). It argues that both consumer 
and producer, groups have 'been active in agency policy making and that 
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neither group receives a dominant share of benefits. This pattern 
supports the predictions of the political cycles view. Neither the 
cartel-by-design nor the life cycle approach are compatible with these 
results since both predict the dominance of a single group .. 
The discussion first d e s c ribes the major component of CPSC's 
regulatory development, the lI o fferor process. 11 The exposition focuses 
on the susceptibility of this process to the influence of both consumer 
and producer groups, and on the way each can benefit from becoming an 
offeror to write standards. 6 The case history of bicycle safety 
standards illustrates how industry groups benefit from safety regulation 
and how active consumer groups can influence outcomes while inactive 
groups cannot. 
Next, consumer and producer evaluation of CPSC performances 
are examined. Though both groups find fault with the Commission, 
neither condemns it for ignoring their interests by focusing solely on 
the other groups. 
Finally, evidence of CPSC's r esponse to various groups is 
revealed by CPSC's petition lag. Section 10 of the CPSA allows outside 
individuals or groups to intitate CPSC action through a petitioning 
process. By studying which groups utilize this provision and by 
assessing their relative success rates, the Commission's response to 
producers and nonproducers can be gauged. The results show response 
to both types of groups. 
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The Offeror Process 
Section 7 of the CPSA defines the off.eror process which is the 
major component of CPSC's regulatory development. The Commission is 
potentially more dependen~ upon the organized interest than most 
agencies; it cannot writ~ its mm standards due to the nature of the 
offeror process. 
The stages in the process are as follows. First, the 
Commission identifies which products should be considered for mandatory 
product standards and which hazards are to be addressed. 7 Next, it must 
solicit offerors to undertake the actual development of provisional 
standards. CPSC can write the standards onl y if no qualified offeror 
comes forth. If several parties submit bids the Commission may choose 
among them to accept the one it feels best qualified, according to the 
criteria it has adopted . It may also contribute to an offeror's costs: 
If an offer is accepted under this subsection, the Commission 
may agree to contribute to the offeror's cost in developing 
a proposed consumer product safety standard, in any case in 
which the Commission determines that such contribution is 
likely to result in a more satisfactory standard than would 
be developed without such contribution . [Section 7 (d) (2)]8 
The Commission's influences on regulatory deve lopment are 
threefold. First, it chooses products to be considered for mandatory 
standards development; second, it selects the offeror (the decis ion 
to fund offerors obviously influences standard development at this 
stage); third, it may accept or reject the proposals . The effects on 
policy outcomes by the Commission's use of these three decision 
variables will now be discussed; however, partial consideration of the 
first variable will follow in a later subsection, "Petitioning CPSC." 
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Both consumer an~ industry groups have an interest in under-
taking standards development. The latter group has several reasons 
for participation. First, writing the standards itself reduces 
uncertainty; it is unlikely that the ~ndustry would impose standards 
strong enough to put itself out of business. Second, cpse regulations 
have a major advantage over voluntary standards written by trade 
associations; mandated standards are legally enforceable.9 By 
incorporating anticompetitive design specifications along with safety 
standards, the industry can combine its cartel forming endeavor with 
the force of law. Consumers, on the other hand, benefit by undertaking 
standard development since they are more likely to focus on safety 
concerns than on incorporating anticompetitive provisions. 
A fundamental asymmetry exists between the participation of 
producers and consumers as offerors. Producers are more likely to be 
willing and able to financially underwrite the development of standards 
than consumer groups because of their relative concentration and 
greater ability to privatize the benefits of their actions.IO Therefore, 
the Commission's policy regarding contributions to offeror's cost 
influences regulatory outcomes by affecting consumer groups' ability 
to participate. 
In the first four years, CPSC's policy on funds for offerors 
has not gone well for consumer groups. The Commission has interpreted 
section 7(d)(2) as intending only partial reimbursement. Since groups 
other than those connected with the industry are unlikely to participate 
without full cost reimbursement, this policy is a blow to consumer 
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. participation. Peter Schuck, director of the Washington office of 
Consumers Union, critici zed Commission policy after CU's financially 
disastrous experience in the de velopment of the power lawn mower 
standards: 
The Commission has indicated that all other things be ing equal, it 
will look favorably upon consumer candidates to be offerors. 
But therein lies the problem. All other things are not equal. In 
particular -- here the degree of my understatement cannot be over-
stated -- consumer organizations are not equal to industry groups 
in terms of the financia l resources necessary to develop a techni-
cally complicated safety standard as off eror. Indeed, I can say 
without fear of contradiction that so long as the funding for the 
offeror program remains at its present level, no consumer organiza-
tion, with the possible exception of Consumers Union, ca n afford 
to be an offeror ... I daresay • .. Consumers Union will have 
to thiQk long and . hard before it makes this sort of expenditure 
again. 11 
If continued, this policy biases the benefits from the promulgation of 
mandatory product safety standards in favor of producer groups . However, 
indications of a change in Commission policy have recently appeared. In 
public hearings before the House Appropriations Committee, the Commis-
sioners openly criticized this policy, and have asked for an increase 
in funds to compensate offerors~ According to Commissione r Pittle, 
That million dollars in the proposed budget, in my view, is 
necessary if we want to provide an opportunity for consumer groups 
to be involved in the offeror process. We have to look at 
$150,000 to $200,000 to underwrite the ir expenses. You can 
reduce that number to practically nothing if you decide you are not 
going to have any consumer groups participate. This would leave 
only industry groups. We want to have a wide spectrum of offerors.12 
A "wide spectrum" ·of offerors, as Commissioner Pittle termed it, will 
allow both producer and consumer groups to be influential in standards 
promulgation. 
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The third, and final, source of influence over the out-
comes of the offeror process is the Commission's discretion to accept or 
reject the proposals. Through its own in-house research and analysis, 
the Commission can attempt to distinguish between safety standards a nd 
anticompetitive design standards ; it may also attempt to judge whether 
a particular standard solves the problem it meant to address. A lack 
of resources for analys is restricts the Commission'S ability to make 
critical judgements and limits CPSC to considering whether the offeror 
addressed all problems noted by the Commiss ion . . This leaves the 
participant groups to police one another (as in the case of bicycles 
discussed l ater) . The next section studies Congress ional behavior on 
this variable. 
Inadequate Analytic Capacity 
The case history of bicycle standards illust rates many 
facets of the previous discussion . Although not develope d under CPSA 
(the process was begun by the FDA's Bureau of Product Safe ty sever al 
years before CPSA's passage) , the standard writing s e quence was quite 
similar. The trade association of the American bicycle manufacturers 
developed the standards without compensation. The proposals involved 
an elaborate set of regulations, each with a r .ationale exhibiting the 
type of hazard it was meant to address. Buried among the safety 
standards were a complicated series of design specifications meant to 
limit the importation of foreign bicycles.13 CPSC, which had taken 
over the promulgation process of these standards, proposed the 
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standards without knowledge of design specifications. The proposals 
never became law, however; because of heated outcries from the small 
but well-organized group of cyclists, CPSC recommitted the standards 
for further study. 
This example shows how producer groups may attempt to use 
the development process to their own advantage. Unless a subset of 
consumers of the particular product are dedicated and well organized~4 
or unless the Commission has sufficient r esources for its own analysis, 
industry is likely to be successful. Further, the example reveals 
that consumers do influence regulatory outcomes and that anti-
competitive regulations are more l ikely the result of a lack of 
consumer participation than a facet of a political system which 
allows them no voice. In sum, the offeror process seems designed 
to allow influence by all participants; of course, if only producers 
participate , they are more likely to capture the gains from standards 
development. 
Views of the Participants 
The Senate Commerce Committee recently held oversight hearings 
15 
on the CPSC. Various consumer groups and producers were invited to 
present their views on agency performance in addition to the Commis-
sioners. Opinions on the agency's performance since the passage of 
the CPSA are quite uniform within each group. The statements r ep resent 
the groups' evaluation of Commission performance in terms of the 
benefits and costs derived from CPSC policy. While both consumer 
and producer groups want to improve the Commission's performance 
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(presumably to increase the benefits which they receive), neither is 
totally dissatisfied. Nor are there any claims that the agency has 
ignored their interests. 
The discussion also reveals that CPSC has not courted 
either type of group as its main supportive constituency. In their 
testimony, each suggests how that might occur. Consumers request 
greater participation in standards development through the offeror 
process, while producers want CPSC ~o rely .on a voluntary compliance 
program in which they play the major role. 
Every consumer group that testified complains that the 
Commission proceeds too slow1y.16 Though each explains CPSC's lack 
of progress a little differently, all ask for more activity; this 
indicates that the Commission's impact is not totally contrary to 
their interests. CPSC's decision not to fully compensate offerors is 
their only substantive criticism of the agency. Since CPSC contribu-
tions largely determine the degree of their direct participation, the 
decision keeps these groups from becoming the major pool from which 
offerors are drawn. 
Producers, on the other hand, uniformly draw attention to 
the Commission's failure to fully support and launch a voluntary 
17 
standards development program. Few comments are made about the 
offeror process except to support their major contention a They argue 
that since the Commission's limited resources necessarily place a 
ceiling on the number of products addressed through mandatory 
standards development, the only hope for safer consumer products is 
industrial participation" through voluntary standards development. 
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Proper oversight of a voluntary standards program, though 
expensive and difficult to maintain, might yield safer products and 
minimize anticompetitive uses of the process. For example, by 
incorporating sanction mechanisms for inappropriate use of the process 
along with systematic scrutiny of voluntary standards, CPSC could 
consider a large number of products. 
However, it need not work in this manner. Performances of 
past voluntary compliance programs have been poor. Judging from the 
experience of the FTC and the FDA with voluntary programs, it is not 
surprising that industry groups favor this line. Both of these 
agencies relied on voluntary programs in the 19508 and evaluations of 
their impact are pessimistic. I8 Since a voluntary approach often 
lacks enforcible sanctions, it provides little incentive to follow 
the rules. 
Petitioning CPSC 
Section 10 of the CPSA allows any individual or group to 
petition the Commission to initiate action and requires CPSC to act 
on it within 120 days. This allows a unique interaction ,·,ith the 
political environment to set or adjust the agency's priorities. 
Although the Commission may choose which products to consider under 
section 7, section 10 allows others to initiate action. In fact, the 
first two standards to complete the development process (swimming pool 
slides and architectural glazing materials) resulted from petitions. 
The CPSC petition log indicates the agency's response to 
19 
consumers and producers. Two summary indexes are relevant. First 
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which groups are using the petition opportuni ty? Second, what is the 
relative success rate of each group? This information is contained 
in Table 8- 1, " Status of Petitions Under CrSA." 
TABLE 8-1: STATUS OF PETITIONS UNDER CPSA 
(as of July 1976) 
Denied Granted Pending Other Total 
Consumer 
Groups 6 3 2 0 11 
Industry 6 6 2 2 16 
Individua1sa 4 2 12 8 26 
Governmental 
Agents 1 2 2 0 5 
Otherb 1 1 4 0 6 
Total petitions 18 14 22 10 64 
Source : "epse Petition Log" supplied by cpse 
a. Affiliation, if any, not indicated . 
b. Mostly l awyers (with no affiliation indicated). 
The petitioning process works to the slight advantage of 
producers. The data reveal that they petition cpse more often than 
consumers, and with greater success. More importantly, however, Table 
8-1 shows that the process doesn ' t work to the strict advantage of 
either group; both make use of pe t itions . 
cPsc BUDGETARY PATTERNS 
cpse officially began operating in May of 1973. Its budget 
for the next fiscal year (less than two months away) had been 
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determined by officials in the FDA's Bureau of Product Safety, a 
predecessor to the Commission. The Commission had little influence 
in the establishment of its programs since this became CPSC's base 
budget. CPSC has continually tried to reallocate its resources among 
its programs to reflect i·ts own priori ties. Congress has denied the 
change each year. 
Contrasting the Commission's budgetary requests with the 
actual appropriations reveals the directions in which the Commission 
attempts to alter its operations and those which Congress actually 
chooses. The pattern reveals that the Commission continually seeks 
greater independence and that Congress repeatedly grants it less. 
Unlike nearly all other agencies in the Federal government, 
CPSC's budgetary request is not filtered through the President's Office 
of Hanagement and Budget (OHB). Normally, OHB readjusts an agency's 
requests to bring them in line with the President's priorities before 
the federal budget goes to the Congress. The Commission submits its 
requests directly to Congress because of a unique provision in the 
CPSA.20 Therefore, the figures reflect the Commission's own priorities 
rather than those of the President. 
Table 8-2 summarizes CPSC's budgetary history (Table 8-3 
contains the complete history). The budget breaks down the Commission's 
activities into five categories. The two of relevance are "hazard 
analysis and remedy,1I and "compliance and enforcement." The former 
represents the Commission's regulatory arm, encompassing the offeror 
21 
process and standards development. The latter category defines 
TABLE 8-2 
CPSC 
AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE PER BUDGET CATEGORY 
Congressional % of Total Budget 
Reguests AEp:roEriation 1974 1976 f-" 0 
'" 1. Administration 37 53 12 23 
2. Hazard Identification 11 5 17 15 
3. Hazard Analysis and Remedy 44 1 26 22 
4. Information and Education 23 4 12 11 
5. Compliance and Enforcement 26 4 33 30 
TOTAL 30 10 
Source: Table 8-3 
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the Commission's efforts to enforce the regulations and provisions 
of the various acts under its jurisdiction. 
Though the Commission requests substantial increases in 
resources for analysis, Congress has not granted them. The Commis-
sion requests, on average, 30 percent increases per year in total 
resoaurces, with the largest increases allocated to its own analytical 
capacity (44 percent/year). Congress approves a slower expansion rate 
of 10 percent/year and drastically limits the increases in analysis to 
1 percent/year, the lowest increase of any category (and well below 
the rate of inflation during this period). In comparison, the 
Commission's requests for compliance activities fare better. Asking 
for increases of 26 percent/year, Congress approves 4 percent/year. 
Through its requests, CPSC asks Congress to increase its 
independence from the organized groups by improving its ability to 
control (and speed up) the standards development process. Congress 
apparently feels otherwise. While the requests redistribute resources 
in favor of analysis, Congress does the reverse. Actual appropriations 
redistribute resources away from analysis by expanding this category 
more slowly than all others. 22 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional efforts through the appropriations process 
increase the Commission's reliance on the organized groups. Since 
consumers are organized to some degree, lack of independence doesn't 
necessarily imply reliance on producer groups. 
The evidence in the previous sections supports this 
W7 . 
conclusion. Though CPSC has yet to produce many benefits for either 
producer or consumer groups through standards development, the 
evidence shows CPSC responds to both. 
This pattern of Commission behavior supports the political 
cycles view of regulatory policy. Both the cartel-by-design and the 
life cycle approach predict benefits for only one group, while the 
political cycles view predicts response to all participating groups. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 8 
1. See Chapter 3. 
2. See David Price, The Commerce Committees (New York: Grossman, 
1975) . 
3. See U.S. Congress, Implementation of the Consumer Product Safety 
Act: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumers of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Congo , 
1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977). 
4. Technically, the tenn should be "consumer groups," instead of 
consumers; as an interest group, "consumer groups" represent only 
a particular subset of all consumers. This chapter does not 
attempt to identify how representative the Consumer groups' views 
are of the entire set of consumers. The main point is to show 
that nonproducer groups influence policy outcomes. With this one 
caveat, present terminology will continue. 
5. Particularly as modeled in Sam Peltzman, "Toward a More General 
Theory of Regulation,1I Center for the Study of American Business 
Working Paper no. 10 (St. Louis: Washington University, 1976). 
6. For a background on the offeror process and an evaluation on the 
data collection system on which it is based, see Nina L. Cornell, 
Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, "Safety Regulation," in 
Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years, ed. Henry Owen 
and Charles L. Schultze (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
1976). For an in-house critique of the process, see Evaluation 
of the Offeror Process by CPSC's Office of Program Planning and 
Evaluation (mimeographed, 1976). 
7. Steven Kelman, "Regulation by the Numbers: A Report on the 
Consumer Product Safety Commision," Public Interest 36 (1974): 
82-102; and Cornell, Noll, and Weingast, "Safety Regulations," 
evaluate the Commision's attempt at hazard identification and 
choice of products for regulatory development. 
8. Public Law 92-573, section 7 (d) (2). 
9. See Michael S. Hunt, "Trade Associations and Self-Regulation: 
Major Home Appliances," in Regulating the Product: Quality and 
Variety.,_ ed. Richard E. Caves and Marc J. Roberts (Cambridge: 
Ballinger, 1975). 
10. CPSC's choice of offeror to develop a standard for swimming pool 
slides shows that industry will underwrite the development costs. 
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Two proposals were seriously studied by CPSC: the industry 
trade association (which originally submitted the petition to 
launch the development process) for $451,500 and a consumer 
organization (the National Consumer League) in conjunction with 
the Ame r ican Society for Testing and Materials for $166 ,450. 
The Commissioners unanimously preferred the NCLjASTM proposal 
to the trade association's. However, NCLjASTM insisted on CPSC 
contributions to cover all costs. Eventually, the Commission 
broke off negotiations and accepted the trade association's 
offeror. The contribution to the l a tter was only $14,175 , 
substantial ly below the original estimate of $451,500. 
11. U.S. Congress, Consumer Product Safety Commission Oversight: 
Hearings before the Subcommittee for Consumers of the Senate 
Committ ee on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington , D.C.: 
Government Printing Offi ce, 1975):23. 
12. U.S. Congress, Department of Housing and Urban Development --
Independent Agencies Appropriations for 1978: Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on HUD -- Independent Agencies of the House 
Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong ., 1st sess. (I-lashington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977):119. 
13. John Forester, "Toy Bike Syndrome," Bike World 2 (1973):24-27. 
14. Their existence (as in the case of the bicycles) is the exception 
rather than the rule. 
15. U.S. Congress, Implementation of the Consumer Produc t Safety Act . 
16. Ibid., 1-43. 
17. Ibid., 45-102. 
18. See Chapter 10 on the FTC and Chapter lIon the FDA. 
19. Section 10 allows petitions under any of the Acts which the 
Commiss i on administers. Only petitions under CPSA are analyzed. 
20. Section 27 (k). 
21. CPSC's data collection and overall analys is of product safety is 
under category 2, "hazard identification" (see note 7). The Com-
mission ',s choice of products to regulate is under "hazard analysis. 
22. Richard Simpson, CPSC's first chairman , substantiated the claim 
that this pattern of appropriations restricted the Commission's 
indepe ndence: 
Such a reduction [in analytical capability] will especially 
impac t upon the ability of the commission to address the 
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development of mandatory product safety standards and will 
limit the overall evaluation of the offeror concept as 
embodied in the CPSA. Such a large and absolute reduction 
in funding, along with continued constraints on staffing, 
will have a devastating impact on the Commission. . . . 
Further, if such funding restrictions are maintained in the 
long term, the Commission has no choice but to consider 
substantial structural changes and adjustments to provide 
the adoption of a purely reactive approach to product 
safety rather than the planned and systematic standards 
development approach now envisioned. 
U.S. Congress, Department of Housing and Urban Development z and 
Certain Independent Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976: 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appro-
priations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1975): 821-822. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE OCCUPATIONAL AND SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is 
like CPSC in many respects including two in particular. First, labor, 
the group nominally designed to benefit from occupational rEgulation, 
is well organized, as are producers. Second, this agency lacks full 
control over its standards development process. Regulation for health 
hazards, probably the area with the greatest potential benefits from 
standards, must be developed in coordination with the National Institute 
of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), a separate agency. 
The cartel-by-design thesis fails to make unambiguous 
predictions about OSHA's behavior in this case as well. Should 
industry or organized labor be considered the main interest group 
to benefit from agency policy making? 
The stylized facts characterizing OSHA's performance are 
consistent with the political cycles view of regulation but not with 
either the cartel-by-design or the life cycle views. The first section 
of the chapter applies these approaches to OSHA's policy making, pre-
senting the expected performance indicated by each view. The next sec-
tion briefly summarizes OSHA's history. It argues that the regulatory 
apparatus designed by Congress has stifled the production of standards 
(and hence benefits this type for any group). The agency's budgetary 
history supports this conclusion and is presented in the last section. 
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PREDICTIONS OF EACH CAPTURE HYPOTHESIS 
OSHA may use its standards development powers for two purposes. 
The first, safer work environments, benefits employees by addressing 
1 
the informational inefficiency inherent in the safety problem. The 
second, anticompetitive design features, b enefits producers. Each 
view of the policy process makes different predictions about OSHA's 
use of standards development to determine the mix of these benefits. 
The cartel-by-design approach pred icts that the most organized 
group in the agency's policy environment dominates agency policy making. 2 
This yields ambiguous results when applied to OSHA since both labor and 
business are organized. Particularly troubling for this view i s that 
labor's organization and coordination probably exceeds that of business 
(as does its voting power) ·at the aggregate level. This dilemma is 
resolved by invoking Jordan's formulation. 3 His version of the cartel-
by-design thesis, the producer protection model, specifies producers as 
the prime recipients of agency benefits (independent of the degre e of 
organiza tion of the opposition). OSHA's regulat ion should concentrate on 
incorporating anticDmpetitive features rather than safety improvements 
into standards development . 
The life cycle thesis predicts that the mass -based group, labor, 
will be the primary benef iciary from agency policy making during OSHA's 
first years. OSHA's policy should change over time, however, until it 
benefits producers. The initial benefits of regulation should 
accrue to labor by concentrating on safety considerations in standards 
writing. Regulation should begin to encompass anti competitive features 
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while diminishing the focus on safety consider'ations until anti-
competitive uses dominate. 
Finally, the political cycles view predicts that both groups 
will benefit from OSHA's regulation. Neither should be observed to 
dominate agency policy making by receiving a disproportion of agency 
benefits. OSHA's standards should benefit both groups, perhaps by 
balancing safety considerations along with anticompetitive features. 
,OSHA REGULATION 
The first evidence against the producer protection view is 
Congress's placement of OSHA within the federal bureaucracy. OSHA 
is lodged within the Department of Labor which is known for its support 
and lobbying efforts on behalf of organized labor. The basic argument 
of this chapter is that Congress created OSHA for labor's benefit but 
placed cumbersome restrictions on the agency's standards development 
process and enforcement activities to minimize the negative impact on 
producers. 
Standards Development 
Safety and health regulation by OSHA, as dictated in the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act), are two separate processes 
within the agency. Each requires a different path to produce standards. 
Several thousand industry "consensus ll standards were in effect 
prior to OSHA's creation. Such standards are developed by nationally 
recognized standards writing organizations. Only two organizations 
fit the definitions of the OSH Act, the American National Standards 
.Institute and the National Fire Protection Association. Section 3 of the 
OSH Act allowed OSHA to adopt any standards produced by thes e organiza-
tions as "interim" standards. In addition, it was allowed to adopt 
existing federal standards. 4 OSHA adopted 4,400 interim standards 
5 
under section 3, of which 45 percent were existing consensus standards. 
OSHA may also develop new standards under the OSH Act. This 
involves an e l aborate procedure which includes the study of the latest 
scientific evidence, the f easibility of standards and the inflationary 
impact. A set of formal hearings where all interested parties may 
participate must follow these studies. 
OSHA's performance in producing new safety standards under this 
process has been slow. It developed only four new standards in its 
first four years. Several others are in various stages of completion, 
including a project to revise a large port ion of .the existing interim 
standards. 
The slow pace of standards development ioplies that OSHA has 
produced few benefits for either constitutency by the promulgation of 
new safety regulations. One possible way to study the likely distribu-
tion of OSHA's benefits is to determine who benefits from the revision 
and updating of the existing interim standards since this major project 
is underway. 
The slow pace may cause a serious problem in later years 
which will harm producers. Most production techniques evolve technologi-
cally over time. New design methods may bear only a slight resemblance 
to the original techniques. Nonetheless, the original standards remain 
in effect unless updated by OSHA. Revising current standards requires 
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the same cumbersome process even though a good deal of the process may 
be wasted repetition. Resource limitations restrict the number of 
standards (new or revised) which the agency can consider simultaneously. 
Since the pace of the development process has proved so slow, revision 
of existing standards is likely to lag considerably behind the rate of 
technological innovation. Industries with old standards may face a 
competitive disadvantage because of the impared ability to develop 
technologically. Until new techniques are approved, these industries 
may be harmed by foreign producers not subject to the restrictions and 
by technological advances in markets for substitute goods. 
One businessman from Texas explained how the inflexibility 
affected his operation to his Congressman: 
One specific point is in regard to the pressure vessels which we 
manufacture in our plant for the oil and gas industry and refineries. 
In order to retain our certification to build pressure vessels 
in accordance with ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, we must 
construct them in accordance with the latest edition of the Code. 
However, the OSHA Regulations still refer to previous editions 
of the Code. Therefore, we could get caught in the middle in 
providing equipment for our customers. 
The discrepancy in the two sets of regulations may prohibit firos from 
operating until the inconsistency is resolved. 
The process required by the OSH Act for the development of 
health standards is even more cumbersome than that for developing 
safety standards. OSHA is not fully responsible for the development 
of its own standards. NIOSH, a separate agency located outside the 
Department of Labor, must initiate the process by producing a "criteria 
document. II This surveys a particular hazard, investigating and 
summarizing relevant data and scientific evidence. OSHA must then 
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complete all the stages required for the development of a safety 
standard in additiG.n to relying on NIOSH for the criteria document. 
In principle, NIOSH functions as the basic research arm 
for OSHA by providing background material, evidence, and research on 
OSHA's high priority areas. In practice, coordination between the two 
agencies has proved next to impossible, with the two agencies persis-
tently adhering to different criteria for choosing the hazards to 
investigate. The development of health standards by OSHA has continually 
been frustrated by this cumbe rsome regulatory process. Only the 
standard for coke ovens has completed all the stages in the process 
(as of early 1977). Few benefits accrue to any group at this rate 
of activity. 
NIOSH also suffers from a lack of funds. Out of the 42,000 
potential chemical hazards it has identified, it can only study a 
handful at a time. It completed only 13 documents for the entire 
fiscal years of 1972 and 1973. The rate of invention of new products 
with potential health hazards certainly exceeds NIOSH's ability to 
study them. 
Compliance and Enforcement 
Standards development is OSHA's first major policy device 
available for occupational regulation. Compliance and enforcement 
activities are its second. Firms follow the regulations only if given 
proper incentives. Individual firms balance the fines and risks of 
being caught in violation with the costs of compliance. Only if the 
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expected penalities exceed the sure costs of compliance will (risk-
neutral) firms comply. 
Preliminary calculations based on average fines imposed, the 
frequency of inspections, and estimates of the costs of compliance 
suggest that the expected penalties are much lower than the costs of 
compliance. Cornell, Noll, and Weingast concluded that: 
The small fines, the infrequent inspections, and the fairly 
steep compliance costs make compliance worthwhile only if an 
employer expec ts to be cited for several hundred "willful, 
r epeated , or imminent danger" violations when the inspector 
finally arrives. Anything l ess and it is cheaper to avoid 
compliance and pay the fines when one is caught. Since the 
total number of fines in this category during the first twenty-
one months of OSHA's inspec t ion program was only 523, it i s 
safe to conclude that OSHA does not provide much incentive t o 
improve occupational safety . 6 
Robert Smith presents further evidence to support the contention that 
. 7 OSHA provides incentives to follow the regulat~onsK OSHA's own da ta 
reveal that its inspectors cite only the most obvious violations. 
Twenty-two standards accounted for 42 percent of all violations in 
8 fiscal year 1973. The risks from avoiding all but the most obvious 
violations are much lower than the above calculations imply. 
Unfortunately, all the evidence on OSHA's enforcement activity 
is from the early 1970s. While allocations for enforcement activities 
were larger than that for all other. safety agencies, the meager amount 
of funds budgeted by Congress for training inspectors severely limited 
the quality of the inspectors. Only the most obvious violations could 
be observed under the circumstances. 9 Since Congress has rapidly 
increased resources for this category, the pattern sketched above may 
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be changing. Further investigation of OSHA's behavior would include 
similar calculations for fiscal year 1974 and later will reveal 
whether the pattern remains or whether OSHA's behavior has changed. 
This brief review suggests that OSHA's impact on the behavior 
of firms has been slight. Without altering the activity of firms, 
OSHA cannot yield benefits for any group; regulations which impose 
safety improvements need enforcement as do regulations which support 
cartels. Congressional influence seems to have prevented OSHA from 
benefiting (or being captured by) labor or producers by hindering the 
development and enforcement of standards. 
OSHA'S BUDGETARY HISTORY 
OSHA's appropriations pattern supports the claims of the 
previous section. Table 9-1 summarizes OSHA's budetary history for 
fiscal years 1972 through 1976, (Table 9-2 presents the actual budget 
for this period). 
The previous chapter compared CPSC's requests with Congres-
sional allotments to indicate the agency's priorities for develop-
ment relative to those of Congress. It is an unreliable indicator in 
OSHA's case. The requests which appear are the recommendations of 
the President's Office of Management and Budget (OMB). President 
Nixon, known for his dislike of organized labor, was quite hostile 
towards OSHA. OMB's treatment of OSHA's requests apparently reflect 
different priorities than those within the agency and the Department 
of Labor. 
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Comparison of increments for standards development (OSHA's 
analytical capacity) with those for compliance and enforcement activities 
shows that Congress favors the latter. Congress appropriates, on 
average, 28 percent/year increases for analysis and 48 percent/year 
increases for compliance. The latter is the fastest growing category 
in OSHA's budget. At this rate, analysis remains a small portion of 
the agency's budget, decreasing from 6 percent to 5 percent of the 
total resources from 1972 to 1975. In contrast, compliance activities 
. jump from 67 percent to 81 percent of the total. 
Training activities also fare better than standards develop-
ment. Congress appropriates increases of 41 percent/year in the 
former program. The increments may counter the effects of early 
inspections which overlooked all but the most common violations. 
Greater resources may improve the quality of inspectors, allowing many 
other standards to be enforced . 
OSHA's large, growing enforcement base, coupled with its 
small analytical capacity reflects a curious balance of labor and 
producer interests. Only the political cycles view ac counts for this 
pattern. The life cycle predicts labor will be the beneficiary of 
regulation (in OSHA's first years) and the cartel-by-design predicts 
the opposite. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 9 
1. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the safety problem. 
2. Particularly as formalized by Peltzman. See Sam Peltzman, 
"Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Center for the 
Study of American Business Working Paper no. 10 (St. Louis: 
Washington University, 1976). 
3. See W. A. Jordan, "Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure, 
and the Effects of Government Regulation," Journal of Law and 
Economics 15 (1972):151-176. 
4. For example, the regulations applicable to federal contractors 
and suppliers under the Walsh-Healey Act. 
5. Bureau of National Affairs, Occupational Safety and Health 
Reporter: Current Report (May 6, 1971):6. 
6. Nina W. Cornell, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast, "Safety 
Regulation," in Setting National Priorities: The Next Ten Years, 
ed. Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1976). 
7. Robert Stewart Smith, The Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprises Institute, 1975), ch. 4. 
8. Ibid., 63. The twenty-two standards constitute one-half of 
one percent of OSHA's 4400 regulations. 
9. The funds for fiscal year 1973 provided only three months' 
training. These inspectors were then required to enforce 
4400 regulations in hundreds of thousands of contexts. Not 
surprisingly only the most common violations were observed. 
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CHAPTER 10 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the' Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) was known for its strict enforcement of the various 
fur and textile labeling provisions; its role in antitrust 
was limited to such earth shattering cases as the monopoly in bull 
semen or a decline in competition among gift shops in the Virgin 
1 Islands. The Commission's greatest impact on the economy resulted 
from actions under the Robinson-Patman Act designed to protect small 
businesses from competitive pressures in evolving markets. Consumers 
suffered from its enforcement, since this practice limited, rather than 
promoted, competition. 
The benefit bestowed upon consumers by the scope of the 
Commission's activities during this period was marginal at best. 
Antitrust enforcement was generally limited to 'the Robinson-Patman Act 
as action under other acts diminished. Action under the FTC's deceptive 
practices responsibilities focused on a voluntary assurance program 
for major problems and a compulsory enforcement program for trivia l 
concerns. Furthermore, the effect of the fur and textile activities 
on both consumers and producers was rather innocuous, though a large 
amount of attention was devoted to these areas. 
This pattern of activity changed dramatically in the late 
1960 s and early 1970 s following two highly critical studies of the 
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Commission's operation. The first,2 a well-done journalistic expose 
by a group of Nader's Raiders, focused public and executive attention 
on the issue. 3 The second study, undertaken by the American Bar 
Association at the request of President Nixon, reached conclusions 
similar to those of the first. Virtually every aspect of the Commis-
sian's activities was found wantinga In response to these reports and 
to public opinion, Nixon initiated reforms and appointed a series of 
new, activist chairmen. Under their leadership, the FTC was reorganized 
and has since played a greater role in antitrust and consumer protec-
tion, deemphasizing its small business protection role, its voluntary 
compliance program, and its fur and textile labeling enforcement 
activities. 
This chapter argues that the change in policies pursued by 
the FTC during this period supports the political cycles view of the 
political process and rejects both the carte1-by-design and the life 
cycle views as too narrow. The next section summarizes the scope of 
the FTC's activities and the various statutes it administers. This 
highlights a basic contradiction between two sets of responsibilities 
entrusted to the Commission by Congress: that of protecting certain 
competitors (i.e., existing firms in an industry), and that of promoting 
competition. A major policy choice of the Commission is which set of 
actions to emphasize, and hence, which subgroups of the political 
economy to benefit by its actions. 
The following section discusses the predictions of the 
three competing views of agency policy making within this regulatory 
arena. The final section contains the empirical data. Reflecting the 
125 
change in agency behavior following its reorganization~ the data a~e 
surprisingly consistent with the stylized facts contained in the 
previous sections. 
THE SCOPE OF THE FTC'S AUTHORITY 
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) of 1914 created 
the FTC. The general authority of the Commission stems from this 
act which provides for the oversight of trade practices and outlaws 
"unfair methods of competit'ion." The latter phrase has been inter-
preted by the courts to mean acts as defined by the Sherman and 
Clayton provisions, such as price fixing, price discrimination, 
mergers of various kinds, etc. 
Since its creation, the Commission's authority has been 
altered in several important ways. First, each act administered by 
the Commission faces continual court tests which often result in 
reinterpretations of the law. Over the years these have specified that 
the general language of the 'various provisions covers certain distinct 
actions. This source of external influence on the FTC will not 
be studied here.
4 
Second, Congress has amended many of the provisions 
of the FTCA and the Clayton Act and has also added additional respon-
sibilities. The changes have provided a wide range of potential acti-
vities for the Commission with a range of impacts on competition and 
consumer welfare. 
The rest of the section summarizes those sections of the Acts 
which playa large role in Commission activity. Since activities 
under different sections have effects ranging from anitcompetitive to 
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innocuous to pro-competitive, the mix of case loads chosen by the 
Commission determines which groups, producers or consumers, benefit 
from the regulatory policy making. The mix of cases constitutes a 
major policy variable available to the Commission; another is the extent 
of enforcement of agency decisions and actions. 
The FTC's activities fall into the three categories of anti-
trust, deceptive practices, and fur and textile labeling. In the field 
of antitrust, Congress has assigned the Commission conflicting goals. 
The first is the promotion of competition by outlawing specific trade 
practices such as price fixing. The second is the protection of existing 
firms, particularly small businesses. 
The FTC and the Justice Department have joint responsibility 
for the administration of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. In practice, 
however, the FTC has assumed prime responsibility for the Clayton Act. 
The parts of the Clayton Act relevant to FTC behavior are sections 2, 
3, and 7. Section 2 outlaws price discrimination, or the selling of 
identical products or services at different prices to different 
customers. This provision was little used until 1936, when this 
section was amended by Congress. The Robinson-Patman Act extended this 
law to prohibit different firms, under certain circumstances, from 
selling identical products at different prices. Written during the 
depression, this provision was designed to protect small firms from 
the competition of large firms. Scholars uniformly agree that its 
effects have been to protect competitors rather than promote 
.. 5 
competltlon. 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act outlaws certain trade practices 
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which allow some firms to take advantage of their market position. 
Specifically, the practices cited are tying contracts, requirements 
contracts, and exclusive dealings contracts. Finally, Section 7 (as 
amended by the Cellar-Kefauver Act of 1950) deals with merger 
activities. It outlaws mergers which create monopolies or which 
significantly increase the market power of particular competitors. It 
also deals with vertical integrations and conglomerate mergers. 
Vigorous enforcement of the various provisions has a variety 
of effects on consumers and producers. Most benefit consumers by 
restricting anticompetitive practices. Specifically, actions under 
section 5 of the FTCA (such as price fixing agreements) and sections 2 
(prior its amendments by the Robinson-Patman Act), 3, and 7 of the 
Clayton Act serve this purpose. However, merger policy includes 
an anticompetitive facet under certain circumstances. Because of judi-
cial interpretation of the Cellar-Kefauver Act, intervention to prev~nt 
mergers may be used to protect existing competitors, especially small 
f · h h .. 6 lrms, rat er t an to promote competltlon. Actual use of this clause 
is a policy variable to the Commission. 
The mix of cases investigated and litigated under these 
provisions reflects the bias of the Commission toward promoting 
competition or protecting competitors. Ideally the change in caseload 
should be observed over time to determine whether the FTC's policies 
changed in the late 1960s from the protection of existing firms 
towards more vigorous antitrust enforcement. Unfortunately, the 
7 
standard sources of data on the FTC only list cases (initiated, 
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pending, and settled) by the section of the act which they fall under 
until the reorganization in 1970. Since the data are aggregated, only 
the total number of antitrust cases can be observed. A future investi-
gat ion to disaggregate caseload data would allow time series comparisons 
of the ideal sort. Reluctantly, stylized facts and isolated examples 
will be used to draw tentative cons1usions. 
During the 1960s, the FTC's record in antitrust favored 
the protection of competitors with only erra'tic attempts at procompeti-
tive measures. According to the American Bar Association, 
In recent years, FTC enforcement [.of the antitrust statutes], 
with few exceptions, has been limited to enforcement of the 
Robinson-Patman Act, some investigations and formal proceedings 
under Section 5 of the FTCA concerning antitrust problems in 
connection with vertical distribution arrangements, and economic 
studies, reports, promulgation of guidelines, and formal pro-
ceedings challenging mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
and Section 5 of the FTCA.8 
Further, 
In the last year or two the FTC has virtually abandoned efforts 
to use Section 3 of the Clayton Act or Section 5 of the FTCA to 
proceed against alleged antitrust violations involving distri-
bution arrangements. The stated reason is ,that the agency has 
received few complaints charging such violations. 9 
Finally, the Commission's merger activity had declined. While its 
Bureau of Economics documented an unparalleled rise in mergers, 
total resources allocated to the merger division fell. Considering the 
rate of inflation in the late 1960s, this reflects a sharp drop in 
real resources. 
Since the reorganization of 1969-1971, the FTC has been known 
as a much more active agency in the field of antitrust. At one 
point, Commission Chairman" Miles Kirkpatrick, who headed the American 
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. Bar Association study group, was fired by President Nixon for leading 
a vigorous agency. The FTC now emphasizes its other responsibilities 
while Robinson-Patman cases have declined. Examples of recent antitrust 
litigation are Exxon, et al, in which the FTC has charged eight of the 
primary refiners of petroleum products with monopolization and 
conspiracy to monopolize, and Kellogg, et a1 case, challenging 
practices which allegedly supported a shared monopoly among the four 
largest firms in the breakfast cereal industry.10 
The policies pursued by the agency in the field of antitrust 
have changed from emphasizing the protection of competitors to the 
promotion of competition following the Commission's revitalization, to 
the degree that these stylized facts accurately characterize the FTC's 
behavior. 
FTC activity in the area of deceptive practice was character-
ized in the 1960s by reliance on voluntary compliance in major cases 
and strict enforcement of trivial matters. The two major classes 
occurring under this heading are deceptive labeling and false and decep-
tive advertising. In the former area, the American Bar Association's 
evaluation of the FTC's action is as follows. 
For lack of adequate planning, the FTC has tended to select 
relatively trivial practices for staunch enforcement measures. 
While simultaneously asserting the lack of manpower and funds 
to initiate programs to combat ghetto frauds, monitor advertis-
ing, and secure effective compliance with orders, the FTC 
has issued complaints attacking the failure to disclose on 
labels that "Navy shoes" were not made by the Navy, that 
flies were imported, that Indian trinkets were not manufactured 
by American Indians, and the "Havana" cigars were not made 
entirely of Cuban tobacco. ll 
The Commission's record of protecting the consumer was not much better 
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with respect to false and deceptive advertising. While specific 
examples of beneficial activities occur, 
lack of planning has led the agency to commit insufficient 
resources to the area, and deploy them badly. 12 
The Commission, however, has been more active in the area 
of deceptive advertising following its reorganization. For example, 
in response to a petition filed by Ralph Nader and other consumer 
advocates, the FTC announced a new policy of requiring all major 
industries to provide substantial evidence in support of their adver-
tising claims. 13 
Under this category, the Commission is also investigating 
the anticompetitive effects of self-regulation by the professions. 
Following an influential report on the relationship between price 
14 
and restrictions on advertising in the market for eyeglasses, the 
Commission has initiated action to bar professiohal associations from 
making binding arrangements of this sort. The FTC has taken similar 
action against local bar associations and has won a favorable precedent 
in the state of Virginia. 
15 The FTC activities have recently expanded into new areas 
such as warranty protection and drug advertising. In addition, the 
Commission has downplayed its reliance on assurances of voluntary 
compliance. Table 10-1 contains the number of assurances of voluntary 
compliance issued in 1965-1969 and 1972-1974. The number has declined 
from an average above 500 in· the late 1960s to 1 in 1974. In discussing 
this pattern, the Commission comments: 
The Commission Obviously puts little stock at this point in the 
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assurances of voluntary compliance. 16 
_TABLE lO-lt ISSUANCE OF ASSURANCE OF VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 
1965 
776 
1966 
422 
1967 
559 
1968 
507 
Source: 1965-1969 - ABA (1969) 
1972-197417 
1969 
511 
1972 
49 
1973 
16 
1974 
1 
The final area of FTC authority, fur and textile labeling, 
was a growing part of the Commission's activities during the 1960s. 
The relevant statutes18 -were enacted during the depression and were 
designed to protect firms from competition . 19 Technically, these 
actions come under deceptive practices. S'ince they represent a large 
and growing portion of the FTC's budget, and because of their virtually 
irrelevant effect on consumers, they deserve special attention. 
Accurately labeled textiles and furs undoubtedly benefit 
consumers, but the impact is marginal at best. Since a great percentage 
of FTC resources was allocated to these actions during the sixties, 
this necessarily limited the total impact of the FTC on the consumer. 
These activities have played an increasingly smaller role in Commission 
activity following the reorganization. In 1969, these activities 
accounted for 11 percent of total agency resources of about $24 million 
20 dollars. By 1975, expenditures for fur and textile activities declined 
to $235 thousand dollars, less than 1 percent of total expenditures. 2l 
Declining funds reflect conscious FTC policy. In discussing the falling 
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number of inspections which have followed lower funds, the FTC claims: 
The Commission has become more selective and has greatly 
22 reduced its inspection efforts to a much lower priority. 
The FTC of the 1970s is a different agency than its 
predecessor of the 1960s. The stylized facts and evidence reveal 
a large change in the distribution of benefits. Considerable consumer 
benefits are consistent with the data, although they do not conclusively 
prove that consumers are now benefiting from agency action. The 
evidence does show that those groups who previously benefited from 
agency activity no longer do so. 
PREDICTIONS OF EACH CAPTURE HYPOTHESIS 
The potential policies available to the FTC range from the 
anticompetitive protection · of existing firms to the promotion of 
competition. Each view of policy making predicts a unique pattern of 
Commission policy. 
The cartel-by-design view predicts that agency policy making 
will benefit producers at the expense of consumers. Since no endogenous 
mechanics for policy evolution exists, agency policy making will 
continue along these lines protecting firms against the competitive 
forces of the market. Budgetary figures should reflect this stead-
fastness; no change should occur in agency resources, despite the 
rise of the consumer movement~ 
According to the life cycle hypothesis, agency policy making 
will initally benefit consumers. This policy decays over time into one 
which benefits producers. Thus, policy evolution should begin with 
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decisions which promote competition and end with decisions which 
benefit firms by protecting them from competition. No allowances are 
made for a change in agency activities once it has decayed into the 
final stage of policy making. This hypothesis also predicts no change 
in the Commission resource allocation once industry has captured the 
agency. 
The political cycles view predicts agency policy will evolve 
as the relative degree of political support for and against an 
effective agency changes. In particular, in the period with a lack 
of public concern, the agency should benefit producers. These policies 
should evolve from producer protection toward promotion of competition 
as the agency becomes the focus of public attention. In response to 
a growing consumer movement, Congress may dramatically redistribute 
agency resources causing the distribution of agency benefits among the 
various groups to alter. 
INFERENCES FROM THE BUDGETARY DATA 
The appropriations pattern of the FTC from the mid-1960s 
through the mid-1970s is consistent with the stylized facts 
presented in the previous section. In the late 1960s, antitrust 
declines as a total percentage of resources while deceptive practices 
(a major portion devoted to fur and textile labeling enforcement) 
grows continuously. After reorganization, the pattern reverses dramati-
cally. Antitrust activity grows phenomenally; resources for consumer 
protection also increase. This pattern is consistent with considerable 
consumer influence and benefits as the FTC redirects its activities 
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• .,. 23 from protecting compet~tors to promot~ng compet~t~onK 
The budgetary figures for this period are summarized in 
Table 10-2 (Table 10-3 contains the annual agency requests and Congres-
siona1 appropriations for fiscal years 1964 through 1976). The budget 
breaks down the Commission's operation into several categories, which 
roughly correspond to the descriptions in the previous section. 
"Maintaining competition" represents the agency's antitrust 
activities. Prior to 1971 "deceptive practices"I"consumer protection" 
describes the FTC's -deceptive labeling and advertising activities and 
fur and textile enforcement; after 1971, this category includes a new 
set of responsibilities with little reliance on old activities. The 
final two categories are included for comparison. "Executive- direction" 
totals consist of funds for the Commissioners and their staffs; 
"administration" totals represent the funds for the coordination 
and management of the agency's operation. 
The categories of interest are "maintaining competitionl1 and 
"deceptive practices"I"consumer protection." The patterns emerge by 
comparing the figures from 1966 t o 1970 with similar figures from 1972 
24 
to 1976. During the first period, antitrust activities fall from 
48 percent of total commission resources to 32 percent. While actual 
dollars for this category rise (2 percent per year), real resources 
diminish because of the rate of inflation. Declining real resources for 
analysis under antitrust means that, even if the FTC wanted to make a 
policy swing to promotion of competition, its effect would be slight. 
Fewer resources necessarily mean fewer actions. In contrast, "deceptive 
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practices" fare favorably. On average, the FTC requests an increase of 
7 percent per year (near the rate of inflation). Congress nearly doubles 
the increase by appropriating 13 percent per year increases. Agency 
funds for this purpose rise from 38 to 52 percent of total resources. 
Textile and fur enforcement is about one third of this category and 
doubles from 1965-1970 while resources for antitrust litigation and 
investigation, part of "maintaining competition" increase by just 7 
percent (see Table 10-3). 
In contrast, the figures for 1972 through 1976 describe an 
entirely different agency. Congress pushes the agency to greater 
antitrust activity by substantially adding to the Commission's requests 
in the category. The FTC asks Congress .for 16 percent increases per 
year (which is much greater than the 2 percent per year increases 
requested prior to 1970). Congress responds by granting even larger 
increases by appropriating 27 percent per year expansion. Agency funds 
for antitrust nearly triple in four years as a consequence. Apparently 
the committee members are responding to the publicity of the issue 
brought about by the Nader and ABA reports and the subsequent FTC 
reorganization. 
The pattern for consumer protection is similar. While the FTC 
requests appear nearly the same across the two periods, they are 
actually different. The figures are misleading because they do not 
account for the significant decline in fur and textile activities 
from 26 percent to less than 2 percent of his category. The FTC 
requests are down, on average, 1 percent per year (from 7 percent per 
year increases to 6 perce~t per year increases); Congressional 
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appropriations are up from 13 percent to 15 percent per year. The 
decline of consumer protection activities from 49 percent to 40 per-
cent (1972 to 1976) of agency resources understates the increase in the 
FTC's activity in this area. 
The comparison of the 1960s appropriations with the 1970s 
figures dramatizes the changes in the agency following its reorganiza-
tion. The pattern is consistent with that of an agency that plays 
a more active role in promoting competition to benefit consumers. Of 
the three capture theses, only the political cycles view predicts this 
change at a time of . increased public concern. The cartel-by-design 
and life cycle views both predict no change in agency benefits in 
response to a consumer movement late in agency history. The budgetary 
data and stylized facts are inconsistent with the predictions of the 
cartel-by-design and the life cycle hypotheses. The data and stylized 
facts are compatible with, though do not prove, the validity of the 
political cycles thesis. 
CONCLUSION 
The stylized facts of the FTC's performance describe an 
agency whose policies envolved from anticompetitive protection of 
existing firms to promotion of competition following increased public 
attention and political intervention. To the degree that this pattern 
accurately characterizes Commission behavior, it supports the 
political cycles view of policy making. Since neither the cartel-
by-design nor the life cycle hypotheses allow for the possibility of 
l~ 
a swing from a policy beneficial to producers to one beneficial to 
consumers, both are ruled out. The striking change in the agency 
workload bolsters the evidence of the stylized facts. Only the 
political cycles view predicts the observed change in agency activity. 
140 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 10 
1. David Price, The Commerce Committee (New Xork: Grossman, 1975): 
89. 
2. Edward F. Cox, Robert C. Fellmeth, and John E. Schulz, The 
"Nader Report" on the Federal Trade Commission (New York: Baron, 
1969). 
3. American Bar Association, Report of the ABA Commission to Study 
the Federal Trade Commission (New York: American Bar Association, 
1969). 
4. For a summary of this influence see F. M. Scherer, Industrial 
Market Structure and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1970), chs. 20 and 21. 
5. See, for example, Corwin D. Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1959). 
6. See D. Turner, "Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act," Harvard Law Review (1965):1355. 
7. The FTC's Annual Report on the Annual Appropriation Hearings. 
8. ABA, Federal Trade Commission, 67. 
9. Ibid., 68 . 
. 10. For a summary of major FTC activities, inGluding recent court 
decisions, see U.S. Congress, Departments of State, Justice, and 
Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 
1976: Hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on the Departments of State, Justice, and -Commerce, 
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, 94th Cong., 2nd sess. 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975):12-30. 
11. Lee Benham, "The Effects of Advertising on the Price of Eye-
glasses," Journal of Law and Economics 15 (1972):337. Also 
see Lee Benham and Alexandra Benham, "Regulating through the 
Professions: A Perspective on Information Control,1l Journal 
of Law and Economics 18 (1975). 
12. ABA, Federal Trade Commission, 39. 
13. Ibid, 40. 
14. Mark Nadel, The Politics of Consumer Protection (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1971). 
141 
15. u.s. Congress, Appropriations for 1976, 31-74. 
16. Ibid., 211. 
17. Ibid., 211. 
18. Wool Products Labeling Act, the Textile Fiber Products Identi-
fication Act, and the Fur Products Labeling Act. 
19. ABA, Federal Trade Commission, 45. 
20. See Table 10-2 
21. U.S. Congress, Appropriations for 1976, 63. 
22. Ibid., 211. 
23. However, without the case10ad data referred to in the previous 
section, the possibility that the stylized ~acts are wrong and 
that these resources are actually going towards more active 
protectio.n of small firms cannot be ruled Dut-. 
24. Because of the recategorization in 1970 and again in 1972, 
longer cross time comparisons are not possible. 
142 
CHAPTER 11 
THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 
The Food and Drug Administration's recent history superficially 
fits the political cycles pattern nearly perfectly. An in-depth 
look', however, reveals that it damages the case for this thesis more 
than any other example studied. 
Public attention to the agency has come and gone again several 
times in the seventy years since the FDA's creation. Congress greatly 
strengthened the FDA's authority over the marketing of new drugs in 
1962, following a surge in public concern over drug safety at the time 
of the thalidomide episode. The political cycles view predicts that 
Congressional response should benefit consumers_ (i.e., the groups now 
voicing opinions on the agency's operation). 
The budgetary pattern is a perfect translation of this 
prediction (according to the arguments in Chapter 7), into Congressional 
appropriations behavior. FDA analytical capacity shrinks prior to the 
amendments; after the amendments, it increases significantly for several 
years. 
Studies of the impact pattern of the 1976 drug amendments 
uniformly draw the opposite conclusion. The amendments have decreased 
the availability of new drugs, which may imply a decline in consumer 
welfare. This revelation also troubles the case for the cartel-by-
design view since the impact has not been shown to have improved the 
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position of drug companies. 
The next section reviews the_ predictions of each view of the 
policy making process. The following section views FDA history, and 
the budgetary patterns are summarized in the final section. 
PREDICTIONS OF THE VARIOUS VIEWS ON AGENCY CAPTURE 
The carte1-by-design view predicts that an agency is created 
for the benefit of an industry. No endogenous mechanism exists to alter 
agency behavior over time. No change should be observed in agency 
behavior in response to an upsurge in public concern over a particular 
regulatory arena. The FDA's policy should be the same before and after 
the amendments, benefiting producers in both cases. 
The life cycle thesis has no endogenous mechanism for the 
change in agency policy making once the agency has decayed into the final 
stage. The agency remains captured by the industry once this occurs. 
This hypothesis also predicts that FDA behavior in the 1950s should 
carryover through the 1960s. No change shou1d'be observed in agency 
policy making. 
The predictions of the political cycles model are equally 
straightforward. This vie", predicts that Congress should alter the 
agency's behavior fr'ombenefiting the industry to benefiting consumers, 
in response to an upsurge in public controversy over FDA activity. 
Agency behavior should be observed to alter following the amendments in 
1962. 
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THE FDA'S HISTORY 
Regulation by the FDA has been characterized by several swings 
in public controversy and Congressional intervention. Congress 
created the FDA in 1906 at the time of political participation by 
the Progressive movement. Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, and the 
activities of other muckrakers , intensified the demand for regulation 
by exposing the filth of the nation's meat packing industry and providing 
1 
examples of similar behavior in the drug market. The agency f ell into 
a period of dormancy as the Progress ive era passed, follmdng World 
War 1. 
Interest in the .agency perked up again during the Great 
Depression, as the horrors of the unregulated market in drugs and 
. 2 
patent medicines were well publicized. In response to growing 
public concern, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act (1938), amending the FDA's authority to intervene in the market. 
This act revised the original 1906 law by dropping the requirement 
that the .agency had to prove ·fraudulent intent in mislabeling cases 
(e.g., false therapeutic claims). 
The increase in public concern and the ensuing legislation 
brought the agency through the full cycle of policy making. The FDA 
experienced public concern in 1906, neglect in the 1920s, and public 
and Congressional attention once again in .: the 1930s. 
The changes in agency policy making did not end here; 
FDA activities continued to cycle. The agency once again fell out of 
the public forum, following World War II, during the return to normalcy. 
During the 1950s, the FDA's administration of its mandate relied on a 
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3 program of voluntary compliance. Like most voluntary programs, this 
one lacked the incentives to alter firm behavior and had little impact 
on the industry.4 
Public concern over the agency's statutory authority to 
protect consumers reappeared following several years of Congressional 
hearings by Senator Kefauver and the well-publicized thalidomide 
episode. The thalidomide case involved the marketing of a new drug 
without enough evidence on its side effects. Though never introduced 
in the United States, the drug resulted in deformed babies in Europe. 
There seems little doubt that this event moved Congress into action. 
In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver amendments to the 1938 
Act. This significantly broadened FDA's authority and increased the 
requirements for new drugs prior to marketing. The new requirement 
that drug producers had to prove efficacy in addition to safety was the 
most notable change. 
The rest of the Chapter focuses on the economic effects of 
this instance of Congressional intervention to distinguish between 
the various capture hypotheses. 
Studies of the influence of the 1962 amendments on the rate of 
invention of new drugs abound in the recent literature. Nearly all 
demonstrate the negative impact on the production of new drugs. A 
component of consumer welfare invariably declines because of the 
decrease in the availability of therapeutic alternatives. Another 
component of consumer welfare rises since some unsafe drugs are kept 
off the market. After balancing these countervailing forces or 
ignoring the latter force, all conclude that a net decline in Consumer 
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welfare occurred. These results make the FDA a major counterexample 
to all views on agency capture to the extent that they ignore 
uncertainty. 
The main studies on the impact of the 1962 amendments are by 
. 5 .6 7 8 Balley, Grabowskl, Peltzman, Schwartzman, and Wardell and 
9 Lasagna. These investigations utilize a variety of methods, which 
include studying the differential in number of new drugs produced 
before and after the amendments, comparing the rate of new drug 
introduction in the United ' States with that in foreign countries, and 
estimating the change in the rate of return of research and development 
activities to discover new drugs. The investigations demonstrate the 
decline in production of new drugs, no matter which method is used. 
The studies constitute compelling evidence when taken as a 
whole, even though most suffer from methodological prob1ems. 10 Despite 
Congressional intervention following public concern, the FDA has not 
benefited consumers as predicted by the political cycles view. The 
next section reinforces the contradiction by showing that the agency's 
budgetary pattern precisely follows the predictions of the political 
cycles view. 
FDA'S BUDGETARY HISTORY 
The change in the FDA's budgetary pattern, after the 1962 
amendments, reflects a revitalized agency. If the FDA of the 1950s 
Can be characterized as a docile or benign agency, the appropriations 
increases · subsequent to Congressional intervention suggest a much 
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different agency. Resources for the agency's analytical capabilities 
for drugs, recorded as "medical evaluation," increase quite sig-
nificantly, allowing the agency to playa more active role in the 
development and marketing of new drugs. 
The political cycles view, as mentioned above, predicts this 
change will benefit consumers, because the amendments come at a time 
of great public interest in the FDA activity. Evidence discussed 
in the last section shows that the predictions are not .borne out. 
The cartel-by-design and the life cycle theses predict no change in 
agency performance. 
Table 11-1 summarizes the agency's budgetary history. 
(The actual budgets are presented in Table 11-2). Unfortunately, 
the agency's drug activities can only be partially separated from 
its food responsibilies. The categories are defined as follows. 
"Field inspections and investigations" is the agency's compliance and 
enforcement program. Inspections and fines supply the incentive for 
firms to comply with the regulations. "Research and methodology" is 
the agency's program to improve its inspection process (mainly for 
the agency's responsibilities in foods). "Compliance, consultation 
and education" is the agency's activities to help smaller businesses 
comply with the regulations. "Medical evaluation" denotes the agency's 
program to oversee drug development and marketing. The agency's 
responsibilities in this area changed dramatically follm,ing the 1962 
amendments. "Executive direction" consists of the agency's administra-
tive and management functions. 
TA
BL
E 
11
-1
 
FD
A 
AV
ER
AG
E 
AN
NU
AL
 I
NC
RE
AS
E 
PE
R 
BU
DG
ET
 C
AT
EG
OR
Y 
19
58
-
19
62
 
19
63
-1
96
7 
FD
A 
C
on
gr
es
si
on
al
 
FD
A 
C
on
gr
es
si
on
al
 
%
 of
 T
ot
al
 B
ud
ge
t 
R
eq
ue
st
 A
pp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 
R
eq
ue
st
 A
pp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 
19
58
 
19
62
 
1 9
68
 
f-
' 
1.
 
F
ie
ld
.
In
sp
ec
ti
on
s,
 I
n
ve
st
ig
a
ti
on
s 
19
 
21
 
17
 
17
 
66
 
62
 
41
 
.
.
,. '"
 
2.
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
M
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
22
 
27
 
24
 
26
 
17
 
18
 
17
 
3.
 
Co
m
pl
ia
nc
e, 
C
on
su
lta
tio
n 
an
d 
Ed
uc
at
io
n 
19
 
24
 
27
 
21
 
5 
5 
2 
4.
 
M
ed
ic
al
 E
va
lu
at
io
n 
19
 
20
 
68
 
69
 
5 
5 
19
 
5.
 
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
 D
ir
ec
ti
on
 
22
 
37
 
37
 
35
 
6 
9 
9 
6.
 
O
th
er
 
12
 
TO
TA
L 
19
 
24
 
0
"
 
22
 
26
 
So
ur
ce
: 
Ta
bl
e 
11
-2
 
19
53
 
19
59
 
-
-
-
C
on
gr
el
si
on
if
 
A
ct
u.
,
l 
A
pp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 
TA
BL
E 
11
-2
 
FD
A 
BU
DC
ET
 (
10
00
', 
o
f 
$)
 
FI
SC
AL
 Y
EA
RS
 1
95
8-
19
68
 
Iiu
A
--
C
O
ng
r.:
!,s
io
n.
ll 
fU
A-
-
-
C
on
gr
"d
on
al
 
R
Qs
ue
at 
A
pp
ro
ur
ia
tt
on
 
R
eq
ue
st
 A
pp
ro
pr
ia
ti
o
n
 
19
60
 
19
61
 
19
62
 
19
63
 
l'J
M
 
~C
ol
lg
re
-E
MU
io
nal
 
FD
A 
Co
n
gr
ea
$1
on
d 
FO
il 
t,
'n
l,r
<"
;lI
ic
m
al
 
R
cs
u
u
t
 ~
!K
!!
!i
!!
!!
K 
Re
qu
es
t 
A
pp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 o
cg
uo
!~
t 
!-
2r
ro
pt
1a
ti
on
 
1
. 
t'i
cl
d
 I
Il
'p
cc
.t1
on
. 
ln
vl
lll
ti
g
at
io
ftl
 
& 
La
b 
"
n
aI
y.
II
i"
 
6,
 )5
6 
7 ,
17
9 
7 ,
61
5 
8,
64
5 
10
,9
02
 
I2
,I
iH
 
15
,11
06
 
13
.3
62
 
17
, )
95
 
H
i,l
oZ
0 
19
K~
lb
 
20
,1
58
 
2.
 
Re
lle
.1"
Cc
h 
,
 
:i
ct
ho
do
lo
gy
 
1.
59
3 
1.
69
8 
2,
21
6 
2,
80
1 
2,
86
6 
3.
21
5 
4,
28
4 
3.
88
4 
4,
96
4 
4,
92
1 
6,
37
9 
6,1
16
0 
J.
 C
o~
pl
ta
l1
ce
K 
C
on
au
lt
at
io
n 
,,
, 
m
 
61
3 
68
. 
'"
 
92
3 
1,
10
8 
1,
17
1}
 
1,
73
2 
1,
12
2 
2,
01
1)
 
1,
91
4 
,
 
E
du
ca
ti
on
 
4.
 I
11
ld
ic
31
 
E
v.
du
at
io
n 
,0
< 
m
 
'"
 
76
3 
99
' 
1,
11
3 
1,
30
8 
1,
16
e 
1,
45
6 
2,
04
0 
),
91
8 
3,
21
7 
5.
 
E
xe
cu
ti
ve
 D
ir
ec
ti
on
 
'
19
 
61
7 
11
1 
1,
00
3 
1,
29
} 
1.
43
6 
1,
14
0 
2,
04
4 
2,
13
3 
2,
83
1 
3,
61
2 
},
B
9 
6.
 O
th
t![
' 
n
o
 
ro
'r
A
l, 
9,
59
1 
10
,5
97
 
11
,8
00
 
13
,8
00
 
16
,8
52
 
1
8
,8
'8
 
23
,
58
0 
21
,6
31
 
28
,'0
0 
27
,9
'0
 
35
,9
20
 
35
,7
'8
 
.
.
ll
li
 
19
66
 
19
61
 
19
68
 
F" 
C
on
gr
es
si
on
al
 
FD
A 
C
on
gr
es
si
on
al
 
FO
A 
Co
ng
-r
e8
s-f
on
a"
i" 
A~l
;gg
ill
 
Re
qu
e
s
t 
A
pp
ro
pr
i.1
t1
on
. 
R
eq
ue
st
 A
pp
ro
pr
1a
ti
"n
 
R
eg
ue
s
t 
A
pp
ro
pr
ia
ti
on
 
l.
 
H
ed
ic
a1
 E
vo
ll
ia
ti
on
 
4,
56
7 
8
,0
'0
 
7,
87
9 
10
,4
18
 
13
,1
90
 
12
,3
53
 
12
,3
53
 
2.
 
lIu
e
a
rc
h 
o
n
d 
M
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
5,
M
J5
 
6,
87
8 
6,
85
7 
7,
95
3 
l.
 
S
d,
!n
ti
fi
c:
 l
,
v
a
lu
at
io
n 
2,
45
) 
3,
3
23
 
3,
32
0 
3,
89
7 
ll
,3
2
1
 
11
,9
80
 
11
,1
56
 
4.
 
Ed
u,-
,
 
& 
V
ol
u
n
ta
ry
 C
O
.p
li
an
c .
.
 
l.
]U
 
1
,5
71
 
1
,
8]
7 
2,
68
8 
1,
53
7 
1,
48
1 
1,
32
9 
,.
 
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
C
O
llp
lia
nc
e 
22
.8
88
 
24
,5
72
 
24
,S
'S
 
26
,1
01
 
27
,2
)4
 
26
,6
73
 
27
,1
34
 
6.
 
bx
t~
_ 
D
ir
e
c
ti
on
 
],7
:1.
6 
6,
15
0 
6,
]9
1 
TI
4~
 ) 
5,
67
5 
6
,H
5 
6,
05
9 
7.
 
D
ru
g 
A
bu
ae
 C
on
tr
o
l 
2.
,2
00
 
4,
95
2 
4,
96
6 
7 ~
~U
M 
7,
59
4 
TO
TA
L 
40
,4
31
 
50
,4
33
 
52
,9
29
 
63
,4
54
 
60
,8
51
 
66
,7
49
 
65
,6
25
 
So
ur
ce
: 
Th
e 
B
ud
ge
t 
o
f 
th
~ 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t. 
F
is
ca
l 
ye
ar
s 
19
60
-1
96
8.
 
.
.
.
.
 
"
.
 
'"
 
150 
Comparison of the agency activities, as reflected through the 
appropriations, before and after the amendments, reveals the differences 
in FDA activity. Enforcement is by far the largest single program of 
the agency; this includes resources for both food and drug inspec-
tions, taking two-thirds of the agency's budget in 195. ~1edical 
evaluation, on the other hand, is a relatively minor responsibility 
of the agency at this time, making up about 5 percent of total 
agency activity. In the five years prior to the amendments, the 
agency and Congress want to expand these programs at nearly the 
same rate, maintaining the relative sizes of the categories. The 
agency requests increases of 19 percent per year for both enforce-
ment and medical evaluation; Congressional appropriations are 
slightly higher, allowing increases of 21 percent per year and 
20 percent per year, respectively. 
A remarkable change .occurs following the 1962 amendments. 
Requests and appropriations for drug research and analysis grow at a 
phenomenal rate in comparison with the previous, period. The FDA now 
asks for increases of 68 percent per year; Congress grants the requests 
(appropriating increases of 69 percent per year). At this rate of 
expansion, medical evaluation grows from 5 percent of total FDA 
activity in 1962 to 19 percent of total activity in 1968. Enforcement 
activities expand just a little bit slower following the amendments. 
The agency requests and Congress appropriates increases of 17 percent 
per year. As a percentage of total activities, enforcement declines 
from 62 percent of the budget in 1962 to 42 percent of the budget in 
1968. 
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The pattern reveals that Congress intentionally expanded the 
agency's role in drug evaluation following the public controversy over 
the agency's prior behavior. Yet, studies on the impact of the changes 
show that neither consumers nor firms benefited from the change. This 
observation rules out all three views of the policy making process. The 
life cycle and the cartel-by-design views predict no change at this 
time. While the political cycles view predicts a change, the actual 
effects are in the opposite direction from the predictions. This raises 
the question of which political actors, presumably maximizers, gain 
from this intervention. The two most likely beneficiaries, producers 
and consumers, have been ruled out. None of the views presented can 
answer the question safisfactorily. 
All these formulation ignore problems of uncertainty. Intro-
ducing this factor may salvage one or more of the alternative views. 
If the relationship between the regulatory apparatus and market 
outcomes is itself subject to uncertainty, the Congress may be observed 
to (perhaps inadvertently) experiment with variqus alternatives, search-
ing for the desired effect. The economic effects observed by the 
research reported earlier may be an unexpected consequence. Since 1968, 
Congress has repeatedly intervened in the FDA's regulatory process. 
Perhaps further research will reveal that these are attempts to alter 
the impact of the amendments. Congressional intent could then be 
gauged by studying the directions in which Congress attempts to move 
the agency. 
All three views of the political process can be altered to 
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,deal with this type of uncertainty. The modified predictions could then 
be compared with the evidence on Congressional intent (rather than on 
actua l consequences) to distinguish between the alternative views. 
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10. For a dissenting view which deserves further investigation, see 
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of Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry," in 
Helms, Drug Development and Marketing. 
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CHAPTER 12 
THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
The atomic power indus try owes its existence to the creation 
of the Atomic Energy Commiss ion (AEC) in 1946 and to Congressional 
subsidies that were doled out by the AEC until 1974. At this time, 
the agency was divided into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
which took over the AEC's regulatory functions overseeing the nuclear 
power industry; and the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA). 
which subsumed the AEC's R&D responsibilities. 
The nuclear power industry has fluctuated considerably over 
the years. Many of the technical problems were solved in its infancy 
when it relied on government subsidies. In the second stage. the direct 
subsidies ended as the costs of nuclear plants became competitive with 
the alternatives for baseload generation capacity. The third stage 
began in the late 1960s as the costs of nuclear plants escalated faster 
than costs for other types · of plants. By 1976 they were no longer 
competitive with coal, and applications for new plants fell off 
precipitously. 
This chapter argues that Congressional intervention on behalf 
of an interest group it created follows the pattern predicted by the 
political cycles view of agency policy making. The early history of the 
industry indicates highly favorable Congressional intervention on its 
behalf. as expected by the carte1-by-design view. The political cycles 
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view predicts the identical intervention. Since no other interest. group 
existed, benefits should principally aCcrue to the industry. The 
final period of industry history allows discrimination between these 
two approaches. In the late 1960s the environmental groups became 
a political factor seeking to delay or halt the expansion of nuclear 
1 power. As the second section will show, Congressional behavior at 
this time no longer fully supported producers, substantiating the 
political cycles view. 
The first section reviews the predictions made by the various 
approaches to public policy making regarding Congressional intervention 
on behalf of the different constituent groups. The second section 
presents the history of the industry to review the causes of the vast 
increase in the costs of nuclear plants. The discussion focuses on the 
control variables available to Congress, and how they were used to 
stem or foster the price escalation. The final section reviews the 
budgetary history of the AEC and NRC to discern Congressional inter-
vention via its budgetary powers. 
PREDICTIONS OF THE CAPTURE THESES 
In the late 1960s nuclear power was a commercial success. 
Yet by 1975, the cost of plants coming on line, and cost estimates for 
new orders had increased more rapidly than coal plants, rendering 
nuclear facilities economically unattractive. 
How did Congress respond to the decline of an industry it 
had played a major hand in developing? The life cycle view is i!1-
appropriate here since the industry is stipulated to be the stepchild 
156 
of Congress and the AEC. The industry's creation, an outgrowth of 
military uses of nuclear processes, did not involve any market failures. 
The cartel-by-design view predicts that Congress will inter-
vene in an effort to save the industry. Congress should be observed 
to use its statutory powers on behalf of the industry to delimit the 
factors responsible for the decline. 
The political cycles view predicts that Congress will allow 
both industry and environmental groups to influence outcomes. Although 
it may be observed to intervene on behalf of one side or the other, 
Congress should not favor only one side in the controversy. "The third 
section presents the" specific predictions of the cartel-by-design and the 
political cycles . 
THE HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY 
The " Atomic Energy Act of 1954 charged the AEC to develop an 
economically viable, " safe nuclear power industry . This section briefly 
summarizes the rise and fall of the industry.2 It focuses on the 
factors which, in the late 1960s,contributed to the decline of nuclear 
relative to coal power ". The" intervention of environmental groups and 
Congress are of particular interest. 
The " first two commercial size reactors were begun in late 1962 
and early 1963; they were the last light " water reactors to receive 
Congressional subsidies·. 3 The" capital cost of these plants (after AEC 
subsidization) was about $lBO/KW. Though this disadvantageously compared 
with new coal plants (capital costs in the $110-160/KW range), General 
Electric soon announced it would build a light water reactor at Oyster 
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Creek, New Jersey at $132/KW. Nuclear power was cheaper than coal at 
Oyster Creek due to the low capital costs and cheaper fuel costs. 
Nuclear power -now stood on its feet. Table 12-1, "Orders for 
Nuclear Plants," shows the · response of the nation ' s utilities. Orders 
for new plants picked up a few years aft er Oyster Creek . In 1966, 
utilities ordered 20 new plants followed by 30 new plants in 1967. 
Known as the "turnkey era, " this period saw the industry's transformation 
from heavy reliance on subsidies to vigorous competition with fossil 
fuels for base load power plants. 
TABLE 12-1: ORDERS FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
Source: 
Year 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 -
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Status of 
NSSS Orders 
No. 
5 -
2 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
4 
7 
20 
30 
14 
7 
14 
15 
31 
36 
23 
4 
1 
Central Station Nuclear Power Reactor, 
Significant Milestones, ERDA-3D, July 1976. 
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Each new plant ordered must be licensed by the AEC prior to 
its construction and operation. The first evidence of regulatory 
lag set in following the great upswing in new orders. The . lag 
defines the delays imposed by the formal licensing period between the 
time a plant is ordered and the time it receiv~s commercial status. 
One contribution to regulatory lag is the bottleneck created by the 
huge increase in applications. The data in Table 2, "Average Time to 
Complete the Regulatory Process," show the dramatic escalation in the 
time required for an application to complete the entire process. (Other 
factors such as construction bottlenecks imposed delays as well.) An 
application submitted in 1966 took 86 months to complete the process. 
Two years later, this process had lengthened by 20 months; by 1970, 
an another 16. months were added. 
Lengthening the regulatory process increases the capital 
costs of the plant by pushing the revenue received from operation 
further into the future and by adding to the total interest payments 
on the construction 10a1)s. In part because of unexpected delays, the 
actual costs of nuclear facilities greatly exceeded initial estimates. 
A plant ordered in 1965, at an estimated cost of $120/KYI, cost $240/KW 
on completion. By 1968, the differential had increased to a factor 
of three; plants estimated at $155/KW were coming on line with actual 
costs above $460/KW. This trend continued through the early 1970s 
as the intial cost estimates rose rapidly from $200/KW in 1970 
to above $700/KW in 1975. 
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TABLE 12-2: AVERAGE TIME TO COMPLETE THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
Application Year 
1966 
1968 
1970 
Average Time from Application 
to Commercial Status 
86 months 
106 months 
122 months 
Source: Status of Central Stat ions Nuclear Power Reactors, 
Significant Milestones, ERDA-3D, July 1976 
By this time orders for nuclear facilities dropped off; many 
5 Previously announced orders were cancelled. Table 12-1 shows that 
new orders droppe d from a high of 36 in 1973 to just 4 in 1975 and 
to only 1 in 1976. As Montgomery and Quirk persuasively argue, rational 
utilities simply altered their new captia1 acquisitions from high cost · 
nuclear facilities to lower cost coal plants. New nuclear plants 
coming on line in 1972 cost 70% more 6 than new coal plants. 
Several factors account for the lapse ,in nuclear power's 
via,bility. The first is inflation. Nuclear plant construction 
projects require specialized labor of various kinds. Since these 
projects are often large relative to the local economy, the increase in 
demand for certain specialized services raises their prices faster 
than the general rate of inflation. 
The second is the procedural delay i mposed by the regulatory 
process; the third is ·cost increases which result . from more stringent 
safety and environmental standards. Reviewing the details of the latter 
indicates the potential for Congressional intervention to stem the 
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increases at several points. As the discussion shows, Congress has 
chosen not to intervene. 
The two major sources Df procedural delay are the bottleneck 
problems (present from 1966 on) and intervention in the licensing 
process. During the last decade, two different groups sought to 
influence AEC decisions through intervention; municipalities sought tD 
7 become part of nuclear power pools, and later, environmental grDups 
sought to halt the deployment of plants . 
While intervention is associated with delay, Table 12-4 , 
"Average Time Increases in the Regulatory Process," reveals it was 
not the major factor. The data represent the average time to complete 
the construction permit process (the first of four s tages in the 
licensing proceedings). They indicate that throughout the periDd, 
contested applications took, on average, one and a ha lf times longer 
than uncontested applica tions. However, over the four years, the time 
taken by both contested and uncontested applications increased by a 
factor of three. Despite claims that intervention is the major cause, 
delays imposed by the regulatory bottleneck problems seem to be a 
greater factor. 
Congress did attempt some changes in the regulatory procedure, 
nDtably the "limited work authorization" (LWA), in response tD the 
8 problem associated with regulatory lag ~ LWA's allowed construction 
on all components of nuclear plants except the emergency CDre cODling 
system prior to the AEC's granting a construction permit. 
Another potential route for Congress would be tD expand 
significantly resources for the AEC's regulatory functions in an effort 
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to clear the bottleneck. The budgetary figures cannot be used to test 
actual Congressional behavior in the mid to late 1960s (see the next 
section) when producers were the sole interest group. It can be 
observed for a later period (1972) at the height of the controversy over 
nuclear power . A good t es t of the cartel-by-design thesis against the 
political cycles model compares Congressional response in the early 
period (only one interest group) with that in the later period. The 
political cycles approach predicts a change in Congressional behavior 
while the cartel-by-design-view does not. The test cannot be performed, 
however, because of -data limitations. 
Observations from the 1970s reveal favorable Congressional 
intervention on behalf of producers. Table 12-3, "Backlogs in the 
Licensing Process," presents the total backlog in cases for each year 
in the first column, and total funds appropriated by Congress for 
license processing in the second column. The third column calculates 
dollars per case. (This number is meaningful for the AEC proceedings 
since license proceedings for nuclear plants are fairly uniform in 
complexity, duration, and importance. It is not informative for FTC 
_proceedings since the FTC has a wide latitude of discretion over the 
significance of each case.) The fourth column presents the percentage 
incre ase in dollars per case. Changes in real resources per case is 
an indicator of Congressional intervention in the proceedings. 
Increases in real resources favor producers by facilitating the 
applications process; decreases favor environmentalists by hampering 
the process. 
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Congress appropriated increases of 16 percent/year (on average) 
during the period 1972 through 1976, about double the rate of general 
inflation at this time. The increase favors producers but not by a 
considerable amount; the bottleneck remained in spite of Congressional 
efforts. The telling comparison of the relative favorability of 
Congress during this period with that in the mid-sixties cannot be made. 
Year 
TABLE 12-3 
BACKLOGS IN THE LICENSING PROCESS 
(Figures for end of ,the year) 
Dollars/ Percent 
Case .- increase 
Total 
Backlog 
Congressional 
Appropriations for 
Licensing (Millions 
of Dollars) 
(Thousands over previous 
of Dollars) year 
1971 89 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
July 
88 12.4 
109 18.0 
141 26.9 
140 28.5 
134 34.3 
141 
165 17 
191 16 
204 7 
256 25 
Sources: (a) Total Backlog. 
Status of Central Station Nuclear Power Reactors, Significant 
Milestones, ERDA 30 July 1976 
(b) Congressional Appropriations: Table 12-6 
The second source of cost escalation resulted from the 
increasing stringency of regulations which plants must satisfy prior to 
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the AEC granting of commercial status. Throughout this period, safety 
and environmental considerations increased. According to WASH 1345 
published by the AEC in 1974, direct construction costs more than 
doubled between 1971 and 1973. 9 It estimated that $90/KW of the 
increase (for a hypothetical plant of 1000/MHe capacity) resulted from 
environmental and safety related changes in plant design mandated 
during this period. 
TABLE 12-4 
AVERAGE TIME INCREASES IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 
CONSTRUCTION PERHIT APPLICATIONS 1966-1970 
Applications Uncontested Contested 
Avg.Time Avg. Time Avg. Time 
No. (Honths) No. (Month) No. (Month) 
1966 13 10.5 7 8.7 6 13.8 
1967 21 13.2 10 13.7 11 13.0 
1968 9 22.8 5 16.0 4 31.3 
1969 9 26.5 1 41. 0 8 25.0 
1970 12 37.7 3 28.3 9 40.8 
Source: Status of Central Station Nuclear Power Reactors? 
Significant Milestones, boaA-P~ July 1976 
Congress could have negated the last factor in whole or in 
part. A significant portion of this increase resulted from the 
successful intervention of the environmental groups through the Courts. 
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In 1971, an Appellate Court ruled in Calvert CliffslO that the National 
, 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) applied to AEC proceedings, requiring 
an environmental impact statement for all new plants. Had it chosen 
to do so, Congress could have intervened to reverse this setback for 
nuclear power by granting exemption to all applications already in the 
process or even by exempting the AEC from NEPA's coverage. In the 
past, Congress has acted similarly in the other regulatory arenas. For 
example, in 1948, it passed the Reed-Bulwinkle Act which exempted indus-
tries regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission from the antitrust 
laws. Also, Congress could have resumed subsidies to the industry. 
Congressional subsidies to airlines vary inversely with the health of 
11 the industry. 
In sum, the recent history of the nuclear power industry 
reveals several factors which contribute to the decline in its ability 
to compete with coal-fired plants. Two of these, regulatory delays 
from bottle-neck problems and the Court ruling in Calvert Cliffs, could 
have partially been negated by Congressional intervention. Instead, 
both were allowed to stand substantially unaltered. 
THE AEC AND NRC BUDGETARY HISTORY 
The evidence from the appropriations process substantiates the 
interpretations of the previous section. Congress let stand the out-
comes reached by the various groups through the regulatory and judicial 
12 processes. 
Ideally, budgetary data could be used to gauge Congressional 
reaction to the regulatory backlog that began in the mid-1960s. The 
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funds for licensing proceedings might reveal substantial increases 
appropriated by Congress in an effort to counter this trend, were the 
data available. Unfortunately, the data is unavailable. Regulation 
does not appear as a budgetary · category until 1970 and is not 
disaggregated before 1972. 
The data are available from 1972 on. Recent Congressional 
intervention in response to climbing costs can be observed. Nuclear 
power plant costs can be observed. Nuclear power plant costs were 
escalating by a factor of three and a half (in part through licensing 
delays) during this period. The pattern reveals a slight, relatively 
insignificant attempt to stem the· general trend. 
Table 12-4 summarizes the AEC and NRC regulatory budgets 
('I'able 12-5 presents the actual amounts for 1972 through 1976). The 
two . categories of interest are "standards development, If and "licensing. It 
The former activities develop and implement design and safety regula-
tions for nuclear plants. Activities under the latter category 
include the oversight of the applications process, ruling on construc-
tion permits, operating licenses, etc. These proceedings were shown 
to be a major source of increased costs through imposed delays. By 
adjusting funds for this category Congress can influence the speed of 
the licensing process; fewer funds mean greater delays and greater 
cost escalation. 
Turning to the numbers in Table 12-4, all categories increase 
throughout this period. Comparing standards development with 
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licensing reveals that requests for the latter fare better than 
requests for the former. Congress decreases agency requests for stan-
dards development from 57 percent/year increases to 41 percent/year 
increases; licensing, on the other hand, receives bigger increases than 
the AEC requests. Congress expands this category by 45 percent per 
year (AEC requests 32 percent per year increases). 
Congressional intervention represents a small countertrend to 
the events noted in the previous section. By allocating fewer 
resources to standards development than the agency requests, Congress 
slightly slows the pace of increased requirements; increasing appro-
priations for licensing slightly improves the speed of the proceedings 
over that implicit in the agency's request. By and large, however, the 
trends in cost escalation are unaffected by these marginal adjustments. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter summarized the recent history of nuclear power 
demonstrating the decline in its economic viability. It indicated the 
points for potential congressional intervention on behalf of the 
industry. In general this did not occur. Except for marginal adjust-
ments through the budgetary process, Congress has let stand the 
curtailment on nuclear power's development. 
Following the focus of public attention and the active 
involvement of organized l:lonindustry groups (chiefly the environ-
mentalist), Congressional behavior changed from actions supportive of 
the industry to others more neutral, allowing the policy outco~es of 
the regulatory and judicial process to stand. This is the pattern 
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predicted by the political cycles model and is counter to that predicted 
by the cartel-by-design thesis. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 12 
1. This chapter does not evaluate the merits of these goals nor 
whether the environmental movement represents a substantial 
portion of voters in the United States. The main point is to 
show that nonproducer interest groups' influence policy outcome. 
2 . For a detailed discussion of commercial nuclear power development 
see W. David Montgomery and James P. Quirk, "Cost Escalation in 
Nuclear Power," in Perspectives on Energy: Issues;! Ideas, and 
Environmental Dilemmas, 2nd ed., ed. Morris Firebaugh (New York: 
Oxford University Press, forthcoming). See also I. Bupp et al., 
"Trends in Light Water Reactor Capital Costs in the United 
States: Causes and Consequences, II Center for Policy Alter-
natives, CPA 74-8 (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1974); and C. Komanoff, Pm,er Plant Performance: 
Nuclear and Coal Capacity Factors and Economics (New York: 
Council of Economic Priorities, 1976). 
3. Montgomery and Quirk, "Cost Escalation." 
4. See Margaret Rouse Bates, "Background Memorandum: The Regulation 
of Atomic Energy for Power Generation," Social Science Working 
Paper no. 64 (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 
1974) for the details of this process. 
5. Reflecting the poor state of the economy, orders for coal-fired 
plants dropped off as well. However, as the economy began to 
pick up a year later, so did orders for coal plants -- with no 
change in orders for new nuclear facilities. 
6. Nonturnkey plants. The differential fell to 50 percent in the 
next two years as costs for coal plants rose due to increasingly 
stringent environmental standards. 
7. See Linda R. Cohen, "Power in the Power Industry: An Analysis 
of Antitrust Policy in the AEC," mimeographed (Pasadena: 
California Institute of Technology, 1977). 
8. NEPA, 42 USCA 2201 (W) 1973. See Paul J. Joskow, "Inflation 
and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of 
Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics 
17 (1974):317, especially footnote 23. 
9. Atomic Energy Commission, "Power Plant Capital Costs: Current 
Trends and Sensitivity to Economic Parameters," WASH-1345, 
Washington, D.C., 1974. 
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10. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee vs AEC, 449 F. 2d 1109, 
D.C.C.A., 1971. 
11. For data on congressional subsidies for 1954-1971, see Civil 
Aeronautics Board, Service to Small Communities, pt . 3 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972):30; data 
for 1972-1976 are from various volumes of appropriations 
hearings: u.s . Congress, Department of Transportation and 
Related Agencies Appropriations [for Fiscal Years 1972-1976 J: 
Hearings before the House Committee on Appropriations 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971-1975). 
12. See Cohen, "Power in the Power Industry." 
172 
CONCLUSION 
The cases studied in the previous five chapters were 
selected because the agencies were either recently created or 
recently revitalized by Congressional action. This allowed three 
different views of the policy making process to be teste d against 
one another to ·determine whi ch most adequa t e ly explained the 
observed behavior. 
The five cases exhibit a wide r a nge of behavior. The 
analysis showed that in all cases except the FDA, the political 
cycles model, de veloped in Part II, best e xplains agency behavior. 
CPSC and OSHA operate in a policy environment in which the nominal 
beneficiaries (consumers and labor, respe ctively) are organized and 
participate to oppose the regulated indus tries. Neither producers 
nor their opposition has dominated CPSC's or OSHA's regulatory arena 
in the early years of the agency's policy making. Each agency has 
responded to the interests of the two relevant groups. Only the 
political cycles view predicts that both participants will influence 
agency decisions. The cartel-by-design view predicts that the agencies 
will benefit producers; the life cycle approach predicts that they 
will benefit nonproducers (consumers and labor, respectively) to the 
detriment of producers during the period of agency policy making 
studied here. 
The FTC, the FDA, and the AEC/NRC have all experienced a 
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change in the political participation in their policy environments. 
Congressional intervention followed (to some degree) in each case, 
resulting in a change of agency policy. In the three regulatory 
arenas, nonproducer groups appeared and changed the political 
environment. The effect on the FTC and AEC/NRC policy outcomes 
benefited these participants. 
The FTC and AEC/NRC were long established regulatory agencies 
at the time of Congressional intervention. Both agencies primarily 
benefited producers prior to the change. The cartel-by-design thesis 
has no endogenous mechanism for policy change. It predicts that 
producers will benefit from the time of the agency's creation. The 
life cycle view has a mechanism for only one endogenous policy change. 
It predicts that consumers will benefit initially, followed by a decay 
period in which the producers will benefit. Once in the last stage, 
agency policy does not alter. The political cycles view is the only 
model which allows a change from decisions benefiting producers to 
others benefiting nonproducers. 
The FDA is the most curious case of all. Nearly all 
investigations of the effects of the recent Congressional intervention 
conclude that all groups, producer and nonproducer alike, have 
been hurt by the change. None of the three models is consistent with 
the observed outcome; each predicts the same pattern in this case as 
in the FTC and the AEC/NRC examples. 
These studies have shown that the policy making process 
responds to the interests of nonproducers as well as producers. All 
participating groups, not merely the most organized, are afforded a 
174 
degree of influence in the political process, as predicted by the 
political cycles view. The interpretations of the cartel-by-design 
and the life cycle approaches have been shown to be too narrow to 
describe the variatipns in regulatory agency policy making. 
These conclusions are tentative; two lines of further 
research are needed. First, the five case studies must be extended. 
Each relied on a comparison of stylized facts and budgetary patterns; 
corroborative evidence was presented when available. More detailed 
.work is required to substantiate the conclusions reached in each case. 
Specifically, each agency's decisions must be studied in greater depth 
to discover the actual economic effects. 
Second, more case studies are required. The National Highway 
and Transportation Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, the 
Office of Pipeline Safety, and the Coal Mine Safety Board were formed 
after World War II to regulate safety, and seem to be natural exten-
sions of the cases presented here. Further ivork is also required on 
the older economic regulatory agencies. The discussion of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission in Chapter 2 showed that previous researchers 
failed to prove their conclusions of capture, that farmers may have 
been a prime beneficiary of railroad regulation. The Civil Aeronautics 
Board also deserves further attention. Investigations of airline 
regulation examine policy making twenty to thirty years after the 
CAB's creation. The evidence that the agency benefits producers at 
this time is insufficient to conclude that the agency was actually 
designed years before for this purpose. A final case which seems to 
be a counterexample to the cartel-by-design view is the Federal 
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Communications Commission's regulation of the telephone system. 
Decisions in the last ten years have gone against AT&T and have 
allowed competition over a range of services offered by Bell. These 
decisions presumably benefit consumers; this is a striking contrast 
to the Commission's regulation of the airwaves. Further work may 
confirm the argument of this thesis -- that the prevailing theories 
of regulatory agency capture are unsatisfactory. 
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